Durban Package

The deal to keep dealing

The legal form was the surprise centrepiece of the Durban COP. In the past two years, the world had been negotiating, first at Copenhagen and then at Cancun, a voluntary agreement, moving away from a global legal regime. This was done purportedly to bring the US on board, arguing that it would never accept a legal deal and that it would not accept any deal in which China and India were not parties. So, Cancun formalised the Copenhagen accord. In doing this, it buried the idea of equity as the basis of a global agreement on climate change (see ‘Equity’s slippery history’).

The Cancun agreement was reached after much resistance from developing countries. But the industrialised countries, led from the front by a belligerent US supported by the European Union (EU) and the grouping of small island nations (AOSIS), got their way. The voluntary pledges—including the insignificant pledge made by the US—became the basis of the new deal to cut emissions. This when it was well understood in Cancun that the pledges were inadequate for an effective deal (‘In which poor countries gave in’, Down To Earth, January 1-15, 2011). It was also a fact that the pledges passed the burden of costly transition to a low-carbon economy to the developing world (‘Poor man’s burden’, Down To Earth, January 1-15, 2011).

But in Durban a new idea for a new deal emerged. This time, the EU was in lead. It wanted that the world should agree to commit to a global legal agreement to cut emissions; this agreement would be applicable to all parties—thereby removing the differentiation between the industrialised world and the rest. It was suggested that this agreement, which would come into force as early as 2015, would replace the Framework Convention on Climate Change and step up levels of ambition for all. The second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol (KP-2) was the bargaining chip for this new agreement. The EU said it would not agree to KP-2 unless the world acceded to its demand for a legal instrument to bind all.

India, which opposed the legally binding option, was marked out as the deal-breaker. In the second week, the Chinese put an offer on the table that was supported by BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). They did not oppose the new arrangement, but suggested a different schedule: negotiations to begin after the scientific review in 2015 and deal to be operationalised in 2020. They also set conditions that the existing commitments of industrialised countries, including funding, should be implemented. They also stressed that the basis of the new agreement had to be equity. But there was no appetite for these ideas. In the week that followed, shrill pressure grew on all countries to take up the offer on the table. It was a no-choice deal.

Equity: embedded or lost?

The most crucial phrase of the Durban Platform is the fact that the new agreement, legal or not, will be under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The convention is based on the principle that the world has to accept the differentiation between countries, based on their contribution to the problem. However, the Durban Platform does ask that the mitigation efforts must involve all parties. This does weaken the position of developing countries in taking on such binding cuts. But how much emissions will each country be asked to reduce? What will the target be based on? Clearly, the challenge will be to ensure that the next round of negotiations, moving towards the new treaty accepts the principle and premise of equity. The battle is ahead.

Kyoto Protocol-2

At Durban, the second period of KP had to be negotiated. The EU held it up as its bargaining chip: KP-2 only when the world would accept a legally binding agreement for all. After holding out for days, a draft decision on “Further commitments for Annex 1 parties under the Kyoto Protocol” was issued. The draft decision says little, leaves much to be worked out and provides opportunity for Kyoto Parties to not walk the talk.

The decision says aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases of Kyoto Parties would need to be reduced by 25-40 per cent below the 1990 levels by 2020. But it does not set individual country targets—quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELROs)—without which the Protocol cannot be implemented. It invites these parties to submit information regarding their QELROs at the next meeting.

The second commitment period would begin on January 1, 2013, and end either on December 31, 2017, or December 31, 2020, says the decision.

Just hours after this decision was gaveled by the chair as adopted by the COP, one key KP party walked out. The Canadian minister announced, as his plane landed in his country, that Canada could not take on the “economic burden” of meeting the legal commitment they had signed on. They junked the protocol.

Clearly, this is the big challenge for KP-2 as well. Will developed (Annex 1) parties take on legal commitments that measure up to the drastic emission reduction required? And even if they do, will they stick to it?

Green Climate Fund

In Copenhagen 2009, the world decided to create a Green Climate Fund (GCF). In Cancun 2010, the “pledge” was repeated. In Durban 2011, the governing instrument for GCF was agreed upon. Now all that the world is waiting for is money.

The questions before the fund were: who will manage and disburse the money. The proposal to get the World Bank as the fund’s manager ran into trouble. The Durban decision skirts this issue to say that the fund will be accountable to and function under the guidance of the Conference of Parties. It has been decided that the fund will have a board of 12 seats for developing countries—equal to representation by the Annex 1 countries.

These 12 developing country seats will be distributed between Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, small island states and least developed countries. Once the Board is appointed, it will, in turn, appoint an interim secretariat.

The other big issue was how the fund would balance the needs of mitigation and adaptation. Clearly, both challenges will require investment in the developing world and there is concern that financing priorities could be distorted and add to vulnerabilities of the poorest. The decision once again avoids this, saying it will request the Board of the fund to balance allocation between these two sets of activities.

But the issue that remains unresolved is where the money will come from. The fund is expected (not committed) to mobilise US $100 billion a year by 2020. But there was little clarity on its capitalisation and parties only emphasised once again the need for long-term financing. But even as discussions progressed, developed countries were quick to point out that funding was difficult in times of looming recession and economic downturn.

They wanted money to be either accessed through the private sector—the fund provides for a private sector window—or wanted the world to look for “innovative sources” of long-term financing. But as yet there is little idea where this money will come from.

A connected issue was to decipher whether the funding for GCF was indeed either new or additional, or repackaged development assistance or even private sector investment.

At the end, Durban has the dubious distinction of creating an empty shell—a fund with no money.

REDD and REDD+

Last year, at COP16 in Cancun, the Parties to the UNFCCC had agreed to a set of social and environmental safeguards to ensure that REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, sustainable management of forests and enhancing forest carbon stocks in developing countries) activities do not adversely impact biodiversity or local communities. Additionally, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was given the charge of helping establish a Safeguards Information System (SIS) to ensure that the implementation of the REDD+ safeguards is monitored and reported.

With most countries supporting REDD+, the expectations from the COP17 were that it would smoothen the technicalities. These included a mechanism for review of safeguards, forest carbon monitoring techniques and guidelines on setting forest sector emissions baselines. Among the trickier issues which needed resolution were whether REDD+ projects would be used as offsets by developed countries, and what role markets would play in financing of these projects.

The final decision was to agree to decide on little substantially or best to leave it to governments to decide nationally. Non-governmental organisations following these negotiations criticised the Durban “outcomes” on REDD and REDD+. The Accra Caucus on Forests and Climate Change, a coalition of 100 organisations from 38 countries, point out the Durban decisions would put forests and forest-dependent people across the world at a “huge risk”, as they would allow governments to set their own reporting guidelines for social and environmental safeguards.

On financing REDD+, India was clear it did not want private players to enter the arena. The Cancun COP had pointed towards the roadmap of exploring further financial options—and that was exactly what the Parties were doing at Durban, said Indian negotiators. However, this optimism was missing from the NGO community. FERN, a Dutch NGO which works on forests and climate change, felt the developed world’s insistence on being allowed to trade in carbon offsets to finance REDD was essentially self-serving and aimed at using it to meet its own emission reduction obligations. With carbon markets being touted as the main source of finance, REDD+, said FERN, will end up with no finance in the long-term as there was no money in carbon markets.