The way the shell fills

The way the shell fills

The us and India may have reached a historic agreement on civilian nuclear technology, but history itself will be made by the bargaining that is likely to continue in the future. The deal began its life on July 18, 2005, as a shell meant to be filled with as much or as little the participants want to and can deliver. The separation plan -- between civil and military facilities agreed upon in the intense negotiations leading up to the Bush visit put some catch on the table, but forces beyond the control of the two government will buffet the agreement.

First, as is well known, the us Congress has to bless the deal. Second, the phased separation of the reactors is expected to take years. Third, expect tussling over new reactors and future fissile material production. The debate over the fast-breeders is a good indicator of what is to come. Fourth, what about leakage from the civilian to the nuclear programme? What happens if an engineer from the civilian side decides to work on the military side? Surely, the Indian constitution disqualifies any restrictions on employment. Fifth, what kinds of safeguards will India allow and what does it mean that safeguards will be contingent on fuel supplies? Sixth, what would happen if the Democrats, with close ties to the ayatollahs of nonproliferation, take over the us presidency?

As these questions come up, the us and India will have to continue intense negotiations: while the deal, at its core, may keep moving forward, particularly after Congressional okay, the continued possibility of negotiations is what would keep the deal going.

Beyond theatrics The question really is whether the nuclear deal drives the larger us-India relationship or does the overall relationship determine progress on the agreement? The difference lies in understanding the parallel and only somewhat symbiotic official and unofficial relationships. Progress on the government front depends greatly on the theatrics of the marginal negotiations over the agreement, but advocates of better us-India relations argue that the societal ties between the two countries are organic. They compare this relationship with the us's alliances with Britain and Israel, where deep mutual empathy has buoyed difficult episodes such as the Suez crisis.

Yet there is a sense that this is a moment of change. If the us and India do not consolidate the gains in the nuclear deal as well as in their larger relationship, another opportunity at a natural alliance might be lost. From the Indian standpoint, consolidating the deal means making the most of its nuclear rehabilitation. China and Pakistan are waking up to the smell of an alliance. It's now clear that Pakistan will not be offered a similar deal, while China wants India to disarm its nuclear arsenal. But it is on the economic front where the true gains might lie. If followed by the deregulation of the nuclear industry and new investment in infrastructure, the deal could equalise India's foreign direct investment flow and gdp growth with that of China. Japan and the European Union, the asean states and West Asia would want closer ties with New Delhi.

From the us point of view, consolidating the deal implies shepherding it through Congress and, less onerously, changing the rules in the international Nuclear Suppliers' Group. In seeking to turn India's advantages in democracy, diversity, faith, and entrepreneurship into geopolitical strength, us president George Bush is making a transformational bet. India could be the third great power to rise under American tutelage. But to what end? In helping Japan and Germany rise from the ashes of World War II, the us enlisted them in the fight against communism. What American cause will India serve in return for us commitment to India's rise as a great power?

Almost everyone knows what would bring about a full embrace between Washington and New Delhi and almost everyone knows that it will come at the cost of alienating China, possibly writing off Pakistan -- and in the middle of a global conflict. Since no one really wants this outcome, simple balance of power calculations will have to be abjured for a more deliberative approach, where the process of trying to fill the shell of the nuclear deal is likely to determine the tenor of us- India relations, at least on the official side of things.

Sunil Dasgupta teaches security studies at Georgetown University, Washington dc, usa
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