Hold Up!

The stage seemed set for another climate meeting to serve the economic interests of the US better than the threat of global warming

For the first eight days, negotiations went exactly as expected.

After at least two previous climate conferences that followed a predestined script, the outcome of the sixth conference of parties (CoP-6) to the climate change convention, held in The Hague last month, seemed as predictable as a soap opera. The cast had their cues right. The European Union (EU) came with a position that showed some environmental integrity. The US and its allies (a loose grouping of Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, known as the 'umbrella group') came with a list of unreasonable demands and threats to withdraw from negotiations if these were not met. The UK was eager to mediate between the EU and its favourite first cousin, the US. The court jesters, the G77 group of developing countries, were happy to have their attention diverted from serious issues, and to juggle instead with their favourite toys, technology and financial transfer. The stage seemed set for the inevitable disaster in the last act, when the EU would give in to the US. Another climate meeting would end up serving the economic interests of the US more than the threat of global warming and climate change. Many observers cringed at the expectation of yet another climate farce.

Luckily for them, this particular farce had some very interesting twists in the end.

unwilling to give in at the last minute as it has done so often in the past, the eu stood its ground on the crucial last day, refusing to accept a diluted agreement. The chairperson of the meeting, Dutch environment minister Jan Pronk, extended the meeting by one day in the hope of some compromise. The uk , represented by deputy prime minister John Prescott, offered a compromise plan on the last night of the meeting. According to British and us sources, the plan had been hatched in a lengthy telephone call between us president Bill Clinton and uk prime minister Tony Blair. A small group of us and European delegates worked through the night, reaching tentative agreement the next morning. The text addressed the three issues that had proved the most controversial over the previous days -- how to account for "carbon sinks" such as forests and farms; European desires to limit the use of emissions trading; and what to do in cases of non-compliance.

But eu ministers dismissed this last minute deal during the wee hours of the next morning, in a what was allegedly a 14-1 decision, the uk being the only country willing to accept the us offer. Unsurprisingly, French environment minister Dominique Voynet and German minister Jrgen Trittin, both Green Party politicians, were the most vocal in their opposition of a watered-down agreement. Voynet was head of the eu delegation, as the rotating presidency of the eu rested with France during the meeting. The eu dismissal of the deal enraged Prescott, who dramatically stomped out of the conference centre saying he was "gutted", much to the delight of vigilant tv crews in search of action.

A public war of words between Prescott and Voynet followed. Prescott angrily claimed that Voynet was too tired to understand the deal struck with the us . "She got cold feet, felt she could not explain it, said she was exhausted and could not understand the detail and then refused to accept it. That is how the deal fell," he claimed. "Prescott proved that he is a dyed-in-the-wool macho. [In his eyes], a woman is clearly tired, is scared and doesn't understand anything," Voynet retorted. "Prescott's comments are... pathetic and mediocre."

Svend Auken, Danish environment minister, demanded that Prescott apologise for his comments against Voynet. "If ever an apology is called for, now is the case," Auken said. He had played a role in convincing eu ministers that the last minute compromise provided too many concessions to the us . Jos Socrates, Portuguese environment minister, agreed with Auken. He said the compromise Prescott had brokered with the us would have endangered the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. "I feel it is better not to have an agreement than to have a bad agreement," he said.

Ever the opportunists, us delegates saw their chance to blame the eu for lack of agreement in CoP-6. After two weeks of playing spoilsport at the conference, they now focused attention on the disagreements within the eu . Head of delegation Frank Loy dissociated himself from the failure of the meeting, saying the lack of agreement was due to "a crisis of governance within the European Union". "We showed real willingness to compromise. But too many of our negotiating partners held fast to positions shaped more by political purity than by practicality, more by dogmatism than pragmatism," he said, adding that the European decision-making process in this case had "a disastrous externality".

Willing to jump in and help their retrograde government with damage control, some us ngo s publicly blamed the eu , fuelling arguments in the ngo camp. "This was Europe's best chance to achieve a strong climate treaty, and they decided to pass it up," said Phillip E Clapp, president of the National Environmental Trust in Washington, dc . "After January, the Europeans could face a Bush administration that is almost certain to push for bigger loopholes in the treaty." Surprisingly, even some European groups echoed these feelings.

But Voynet put her finger on the root of a much bigger problem that has recently become more and more evident, not just in the climate talks but also in recent trade disputes and negotiations for a biosafety protocol earlier this year. She said the breakdown of the climate talks reflected a significant cultural gap between the us and Europe in how they approach economic and social policies. The us faith in free-market methods, she said, would be deemed "the law of the jungle" in France.

As chairperson Pronk admitted that the meeting would have to be suspended on Saturday, one day after it was officially supposed to end, only one aspect had gone according to script. As in most other climate conferences, but particularly at Kyoto, the G77 was completely sidelined by the eu and the us while they haggled over their final deal. The day before on Friday, Pronk had officially closed the meeting at 6.30 pm, asking delegates to reconvene at 8 am on Saturday. It was at this time that the eu and the us met to discuss the Prescott deal.

"The G77 had their own meeting... actually it was the beginnings of a post-mortem of the failure of CoP-6 as by then no sign of the deal had been communicated to the group," says Farahana Yamin, director of the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development in the uk . "It was infuriating as just before we broke up at 6.30, we could see various eu and umbrella group ministers looking anxiously at the one pager that obviously had the "deal" written on it -- a page we were never to see."

As this story went to press, it was reported that top government officials from the us and eu met in Ottawa on December 6, 2000, at the prompting of Clinton, who has expressed a desire to see a settlement on the climate issue before he leaves office. Canada and Japan were present at the meeting which failed to result in any consensus because the us felt issues already resolved in The Hague were being raked up again. Had this meeting brought the two sides closer, it would have resulted in ministerial talks in Oslo a week later. Now, negotiations are expected to resume in May 2001.

It remains unclear how the G77 fits into this deal-making process. This kind of arrangement, in which G77 consent is taken for granted without the group's participation in actual negotiations, is the continuation of an extremely dangerous and undemocratic trend in global negotiations. Developing countries protested against it at the World Trade Organisation, where they clearly saw the direct link between the lack of democracy in the proceedings and their economic interests. They will be fools if they take the lack of democracy in the climate negotiations lying down.
EARLY DAYS While the last two days of the conference were by far the most exciting, the earlier days were not without their moments. CoP-6 saw expression of a lot of public anger at the slow pace of the negotiations -- something that has been missing in previous climate meetings. The highlight of the two weeks, quite easily, was the chocolate-strawberry cream pie that landed on Loy's face just as he settled in to address a press conference.

This act of anger by a young girl from the uk , part of a group of 30 activists who entered the premises of the meeting without accreditation, prompted Pronk to call a meeting with ngo s and the media, and plead with them to use only words to register protest, not pies. The 30 activists, escorted to Pronk's meeting by un security, were unrepentant, denouncing the meeting as a complete sham, totally out of touch with the reality of the hundreds of people who had already lost their lives due to climate change. While Pronk has a point in saying that pie-throwing is not the best way to get the us to take its commitments seriously, the incident is certainly an indication of the fact that the world is losing patience with us delay tactics.

Vying closely with the pie-throwing incident was an inspiring speech from unexpected quarters. At the opening session of the ministerial segment during the second week, Jacques Chirac, the French president, called on the us to "cast aside" its doubts and hesitations in tackling global warming and lead the rest of the world by example. He pointed out the climate negotiations would have to address equity between nations. "Do we want to control and regulate the process of globalisation in order to make it fairer and more human?" he asked. "France proposes that we set as our ultimate objective the convergence of per capita emissions." Not amused by his reminder that each us citizen emits three times more greenhouse gases than a French, us senators described Chirac's remarks as "unproductive".

Adding considerably to the anti- us feeling at CoP-6 was a group of 200 us students who came as observers. They hounded us senators, often forming barricades around them and hampering their movement. us allies Canada and Australia also came under ridicule. Proclaiming shame at their country's reluctance to take action against climate change, two Canadian web journalists burned their passports. As Australia unashamedly tried to count in carbon sequestration by every blade of grass in the country, potted plants on the conference premises were marked off as "Australian sinks".

Even delegates did not pass up the opportunity to comment on the retrogressive positions of some countries. More than once, G77 delegates in the plenary made pointed remarks aimed at the us . During a discussion on financial mechanisms, Raul E Estrada-Oyeula, Argentine head of delegation and chairperson of the Kyoto CoP in 1997, said the delegates were "too polite to mention names" but they all knew who was holding up progress at the negotiations.

That was the question written across many tired and desperate faces after CoP-6 was suspended. The prospects for future agreement look particularly bleak in light of domestic us politics. If Republican George Bush becomes president, many fear that the chances of the us ever ratifying the convention will be lost forever. This view was promoted by the us administration, eager, as always, to get a deal that suits them through threats of what the us may or may not do if they don't get what they want. "I think it is fair to say that a pretty important opportunity was not cashed in," Loy said of the eu 's rejection of the final proposal.

Some European groups have also, since then, started blaming the eu governments for passing up an opportunity which may not come by again. But was the opportunity worth grabbing, or was it a forced and worthless agreement like the Kyoto Protocol? Would they really prefer a bad deal to no deal? As Voynet said, "What is victory? Is it a hasty agreement under pressure or the ability to say no?"

So far, the us has relied on its ability to threaten the world with non-ratification to get what it wants. The eu has always been a weak opponent, giving in at the last minute (and not just in the climate negotiations -- they quit their high moral ground rather quickly when attacked by the us -led "Miami Group" at the negotiations for the biosafety protocol negotiations in April 1999). The G77, meanwhile, has managed to sideline itself almost completely in the climate talks. Let alone being proactive in solving the global warming problem, which will eventually hurt them the most, they have not even been able to provide support to the more progressive positions of the eu .

With this background, the political message sent by the eu 's unwillingness to accept a badly compromised deal is tremendous -- for once, they are telling the us that their threats and bullying will not always work. That the us should no longer bank on hurried last minute face-saving negotiations to get what it wants. This newly discovered courage on part of the eu is probably due in part to developments on other fronts. The last two years have seen sustained trade battles between the eu and the us under the World Trade Organisation ( wto ), which reflect the very differences in culture that Voynet referred to -- while the us believes industry and business should rule, the eu has stood up for both regulatory and fiscal methods.

The civil society in Europe should support their governments for standing up against the us at CoP-6, not urge them to take whatever little the us is offering now, out of fear that they will offer even less in the future. The more practical European ngo s are already beginning to see the futility of endlessly compromising the climate negotiations to bring aboard the us . Why should the world go into contortions and compromise such a vital negotiation to accommodate the domestic politics of a nation which is not willing to face up to the reality that their much touted "American lifestyle" is posing a threat to the Earth's environment? After the compromises at Kyoto, isn't it time the world saw at least some proof that the world's biggest polluter sees the threat and is willing to take action to address it seriously?

Even a very diluted agreement offers no assurance that the us senate will eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. According to a November 27 analysis in Grist Magazine , a web magazine with its office in Seattle, usa , "Even if the Europeans hadn't stood tough, though, the document wouldn't have made it through the senate. Not with George W Bush as president, and not with Al Gore as president (though if Gore had carried Florida, these negotiations would have at least produced an agreement). And the reason is simple: the us public still does not believe with the necessary passion that climate change represents a problem serious enough to require any compromises in our way of life. "

Changing attitudes within the us is up to the us civil society, the very same ngo s and media currently so occupied with telling the rest of the world what to do and how to do it. How many us groups that were campaigning ardently against fossil fuel funding or nuclear power to developing countries at the CoP had similar campaigns in their own country? Not many. So the us continues to be one of the world's largest consumers of coal, while senior us delegates seriously consider stepping in to stop the World Bank from funding coal projects in the South. Perhaps it is time ngo s turned their attention homeward and picked up the courage to take on their government's hypocritical policies.

Reported by Anju Sharma, Neelam Singh and Sopan Joshi from The Hague

backwaters , small water courses, dunes with liana-covered Balkan oak-ash forests and sand steppes -- it is quiet, even serene, at the floating borderline between the Black Sea and the land. This is the Danube delta, one of the world's largest wetlands and the largest transboundary river basin in Europe. It is home to hundreds of diverse flora and fauna species. This is where the Danube, on its way from the Black Forest in south Germany through cities like Vienna and Budapest in 10 countries, finally empties into the Black Sea.

Danube is of outstanding importance in the European geopolitical region, which besides crossing the territories of many nations influences the lives of millions of people. The river basin of the Danube covers an area of 817,000 square km, where about 80 million inhabitants live.

Changing its name from Donau to Duna to Dunav and Dunarea, it is tempestuous in the mountains but meanders idly in the lowlands, where it is up to 800 metres wide. But the romantic pictures of Johann Strauss' Blue Danube with shining white steamers and tunes of a Vienna waltz in the air, becomes less and less true as the river travels downstream. Thanks to their long-standing water quality legislation and investment in wastewater treatment plants, its passage through Germany and Austria is largely undisturbed, except problems with high nitrate and pesticides in regions where there is with intensive crop production and cattle breeding. But the situation changes dramatically after the Danube enters Slovakia at Bratislava, where earlier the Iron Curtain divided East and West Europe.

Construction of dams and reservoirs, agricultural pastures and industries along the 2,857-km long Danube has disturbed the ecosystem. Sediments and nutrients have drained into the Black Sea, consequently natural habitats of numerous flora and fauna species have been reduced drastically. Fortunately, now the situation may change for the better and it may be back to the old, lazy days on the banks of Danube's blue waters.

In order to address effectively the environmental problems in the Danube river basin, the Danube countries and international organisations initiated the Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin ( epdrb ) in 1991 and agreed on a Strategic Action Plan ( sap ) and sap Implementation Programme ( sip ). They signed the Danube River Protection Convention ( drpc ) in 1994 in Sophia, Bulgaria. The convention came into force on October 22, 1998, as a result of which the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River ( icpdr ) was established.

The convention draws particular attention to the urgent need to cut pollution loads, study transboundary impacts of pollution, ensure sustainable use of water resources and cooperation between Danube states. It also embraces agreements to define water quality objectives, to adopt joint action plans as well as engage in public information programmes.

The sap , an outcome of the convention, provides a framework for achieving goals of regional integrated water management and riverine environmental management expressed in the convention. sap constitutes the first regional and comprehensive approach to integrating all parties concerned in identifying common regional problems, setting common goals and identifying specific actions as Geoffery Weston, editor of Danube Watch , a magazine published by the Danube Programme Coordination Unit, summarises.

sap lists 179 'hotspots' on the Danube and its tributaries, local land areas and stretches of surface water, which are subject to excessive pollution and require particular action. Nearly half of these hotspots are due to lack of or inefficient municipal wastewater treatment plants. The list includes factories and mining operations, responsible for maximum discharge of hazardous substances. The most recent disaster the region saw was the cyanide spill at Baia Mare in northwest Romania, which was termed as "the worst environmental disaster in Europe since Chernobyl" (see 'Nightmare in Europe', Down To Earth , Vol 8, No 20).

Though lack of reliable data and studies make it difficult to assess the problems of contamination and health risks in the Danube region, one of the major problems are the high nutrient loads -- nitrogen and phosphorus -- in many of the Danube tributaries, sap states. Discharge of nutrients cause intensive eutrophication right down to the delta and the Red Sea, threatening the biodiversity and the economic potential of the riverine ecosystems. It could also lead to potentially high levels of nitrates in drinking water.

East meets West
Compared to Western Europe, attempts for an international approach to environmental problems in the Danube from the eastern block started very recently. They became possible only with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. Since then, former Socialist countries are undergoing fundamental transformations, considered positively by sap . Economic reconstruction and reforms should now create opportunities for improvement of water quality and supply systems, and introduction of new systems, which takes environmental considerations more into account.

At the same time, most countries are short of money. Many are in a desperate economic and sometimes political situation, some just recovering from a war like Croatia and Bosnia. All of them need logistical, technical and especially financial support.

But starting late can be an advantage, too. The Danube basin countries can build upon the experience of rehabilitation measures undertaken elsewhere in Europe. One of these lessons is to start right from the beginning with an integral, coherent approach to the problems in the river basin. So sap does not only deal with emissions and water treatment, but also for example with floods and all other aspects of environmental protection. It gives special importance and equal status to the natural system, including wetlands, which "should be treated as water users, along with people, industry and agriculture.

For the cash-strapped, deindustralised former Socialist countries, joining the Danube River Convention is one step towards closer links with eu . "There will be relatively cheap money available for certain ecological investments," says Meta Goreisek, Slovenia's programme coordinator in epdrb Task Force. Moreover, countries hope to profit considerably from the flow of information and expertise. Western European countries even view the convention as a contribution to political stability in the whole Danube region.

Problems and solutions
The Danube conservation plan, however, could have its share of hiccups. Weston sees weaknesses as lack of financial mechanisms, enforcement possibilities and participation, while geographic coverage in incomplete and the quality of information insufficient. Besides, the socioeconomic situation is not adequately taken into account and economic benefits have not been demonstrated yet. He concludes that to achieve sap 's aims it will be necessary to reinforce public sector participation in future planning, make reliable data available, set up financial mechanisms and create regional funds.

It is too early expect substantial results. It was only in November 1997, when the Danube Basin Pollution Reduction Programme ( prp ) was launched that the focus shifted to the central task of curbing pollution. Until then, the main emphasis had been on gathering information and improving the database, institutional development and strengthening environmental management efforts. The aim of prp , which is in the process of being finalised, is to define transboundary measures and action and to develop and investment programmes for national, regional and international cooperation.

Current expenditure is estimated to be about us $5 billion. One big challenge will be to mobilise donor support for specific actions and priority projects like municipal or industrial wastewater treatment plants. It is expected that a donor's conference will be held at the end of 2000 on the basis of the final version of prp .

Another challenge is to initiate closer cooperation with non-government organisations ( ngo s). So far, the programme has failed to win their support. "Up to now, the level of ngo participation has been unsatisfactory," says Entela Punguili from the Regional Environmental Centre ( rec ), an ngo with a network of offices in central and eastern Europe. It appears that not enough effort has been put into maintaining a structure of permanent ngo and private sector involvement.

rec has been invited by the programme to rally the support of ngo s by using public participation tools to establish and maintain their long-term involvement in the programme. "The project is expected to train a group of facilitators to enable ngo s to establish links between themselves and other stakeholders," says Punguili.

During the second week of the meeting, it became clear that there were four main areas of contention. In climate jargon, these were: sinks, supplementarity, compliance, and funding for adaptation. A note by Pronk to address these issues in what he considered a balanced manner, presented two days before the conference was to end, was not accepted by any of the groups. The us dismissed the note as 'unreasonable' even though ngos thought it reflected too many us positions.

The final deal-breaker, however, appears to be the sinks issue. "The refusal of some industrialised nations to give climate protection priority at home caused the failure," German environment minister Trittin said. "It also failed because industrialised countries wanted to count too much of their natural forests as sources of human-made reduction, rather than actually cutting greenhouse gases." A short description of the controversies involving the main "crunch issues", as Pronk called them, follows.

Sinks
Cheapest way out

If the US has its way, it might increase its emissions and still meet its Kyoto targets

Carbon 'sinks' such as forests absorb (or sequester) carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. As a concession that several European and G77 governments now regret, the Kyoto Protocol allowed countries with reduction commitments the use of 'additional' land use, land use change and forestry (lulucf) activities to meet their commitments. Article 3.4, the now notorious article that allowed the use of lulucf activities, was the subject of major controversy at CoP-6, particularly in light of new revelations by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc).

A recent ipcc report states that there are too many complications and uncertainties associated with the use of lulucf to 'fix' carbon. Activities such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, listed under article 3.3 of the protocol, are not permanent methods. Moreover, each would need a precise definition to avoid serious loopholes. "While preparing the protocol we did not have the information now provided by the ipcc on sinks," admits Estrada, one of the main architects of the Kyoto Protocol. "Perhaps if we had more information, we would have been able to develop things further. For instance, three palm trees in one acre of land would not qualify as a forest."

Given the uncertainties, the eu and G-77/China have consistently opposed including activities like forest management in the first commitment period (2008-2012). But the umbrella group was not willing to let go of a cheap mitigation opportunity. They fought to ensure that the provisions of article 3.4 were applicable to the first commitment period without any restrictions. And they fought to ensure that sinks would be included as a valid activity under the clean development mechanism (cdm) -- once again a cheap mitigation option that would allow them to claim credits, for instance, for planting a forest in developing countries, where land and labour is cheap.

Neither a contact group on lulucf, formed in the first week, nor the numerous informal ministerial discussions could produce consensus on this hot topic. One week into CoP-6, the us, Japan and Canada came up with a very ambitious "compromise" proposal based on creative accounting. They wanted countries to gain full carbon credits for existing forest management activities up to a level of 20 million tonnes of carbon (MtC) per year during the commitment period, or a negotiated percentage, whichever is lesser. Beyond 20 MtC, the country would get only one-third credit, two-thirds being discounted to existing efforts ('business as usual' status). Then, beyond a threshold, which was left undefined, once again full credits should be allowed. This was to be applied to the first commitment period only. Further, they proposed that cropland and grazing land management activities can be fully accounted as their scale would not significantly impact the first commitment period.

A rapid analysis by the environmental group Greenpeace showed that if this proposal was adopted, the US would be able to increase emissions by 1 per cent, instead of reducing them by 7 per cent from 1990 levels ! Though the umbrella group acknowledged that natural phenomena could not be factored out satisfactorily, they were entirely opposed to waiting till the second commitment period for inclusion. When Pronk tried to break the deadlock with his own proposal, it had an uncanny resemblance to the us proposal, allowing the inclusion of additional lulucf activities in the first commitment period.

In the end, it was the sinks issue that led to the failure of the conference. According to one rumour, the last-minute huddle between the eu and us led to a deal where the us was willing to settle for no sinks under cdm if limited lulucf activities were allowed under article 3.4.

mechanisms
No holds barred

The umbrella group fought off restrictions on the use of trading mechanisms

There were two controversial issues so far as the mechanisms were concerned.

l To what extent should emissions trading be 'supplementary' to domestic action by annex B countries to reduce emissions?

l Should a 'positive list' of projects (such as renewable and clean technology), as proposed by the eu, be allowed under cdm. Equally contentious was the issue of whether sinks and nuclear projects should be excluded from cdm.

supplementarity: At CoP-6, an interesting development was the softened stance of the eu with regard to credits that can be gained through activities other than domestic action to cut emissions. This is definitely a give-in to the us. The Kyoto Protocol lays down that supplemental actions, like trading of credits for emissions reduction, can be used to meet targets. But the limit to the amount of credits that can be purchased has not been set. Keen on exploiting this situation by meeting most of their commitments through trading, the us claims that discussing any limit, or 'cap' on trading, amounts to renegotiating the protocol.

But the eu and G77 have strongly pushed for a stringent cap. The eu has long argued for a 50 per cent limit on credits through flexible mechanisms. But at CoP-6, they seemed willing to accept a qualitative target instead of a quantitative limit. Instead of negotiating for a well-defined cap, the eu seemed willing to settle for words such as 'significant' for domestic action. Pronk's proposal seemed to brush aside any controversy on the caps issue by suggesting only that annex B countries meet their targets 'primarily' through domestic action.

CDM: Creating a list of eligible cdm projects and whether sinks and nuclear projects should be a part of cdm were the crucial areas on which there was no agreement till the end of CoP-6. The us, Canada, Japan and Australia are against a 'positive list' proposed by the eu, and strongly advocate using sinks in cdm. Developing countries, particularly India and China, came under pressure for allegedly promoting the inclusion of nuclear projects in cdm.

Though some Latin American countries support the proposal to include sinks projects under cdm, including Costa Rica and Bolivia, most developing countries were opposed to the inclusion of sinks in cdm. Most of them also reject the idea of a positive list, arguing that host country should have the privilege of deciding on projects.

A compromise proposal on this came from Colombia, which presented a proposal on 'expiring credits'. It suggests that all lulucf projects should be treated as potentially non-permanent and resulting credits should expire after a specific time period. After the expiry period, these credits would be deducted from the country's emission allowance. Pronk's proposal, meanwhile, allowed for afforestation and reforestation projects under cdm, under accounting rules and modalities developed by the subsidiary body on scientific and technological advice (sbsta). He also left out the positive list, leaving the choice of projects to a country's discretion.

Japan supported using the official development assistance (oda) for cdm. Developing countries opposed this, insisting on the 'financial additionality' of cdm projects -- that they must use funds over and above oda and foreign direct investment flows to developing countries.

compliance
Polluters turn monitors

Industrialised countries resisted all effort of having a just and effective compliance regime

It was hoped that at CoP-6, an effective compliance system to ensure that countries meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol would be drawn. What emerged out of the negotiations was a lengthier draft with more options that before. None of the parties were willing to budge from old positions. Virtually nothing productive came out. Designing a compliance system for rich countries is more difficult than catching and penalising poor nations. Trade sanctions can ensure that a poor country complies with its international commitments. But what if a rich country does not comply, as is the case with the Kyoto Protocol?

Among the options available is the creation of a compliance fund, as proposed by G77/China. In the event of failure to meet emissions reduction target, a country can pay into this fund at a pre-determined penalty rate. The penalty rate must be high enough to act as a deterrent. It is suggested that a percentage of the fund be allocated to finance projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The us opposes any financial penalties. It would like to 'borrow' credits from future commitment periods, at a 1.3 penalty rate (for every tonne that a country defaults on, 1.3 tonnes are deducted from future commitment periods). The eu supports a strong action plan, laying down how a defaulting country proposes to make amends in the next commitment period.

In the pre-CoP negotiations, the idea of a committee to determine compliance and decide consequences was agreed upon. In The Hague, though, no breakthrough was achieved on the composition of facilitative and enforcement branches of this committee. Countries with emissions reduction targets want a larger representation in the enforcement branch given their share of commitments; this demand has now been extended to the membership of the facilitative branch. G77/China stress for an equitable geographical representation as global warming affects everyone. One consolation came from Pronk's note, which favoured both the facilitative and the enforcement branches to have equitable representation.

Developing countries emphasise enforceable consequences should apply only to countries with reduction commitments. The us, Australia, New Zealand and the eu were unwilling to make this distinction. It was decided, however, that compliance procedures will now apply only to the Kyoto Protocol and not to commitments under the convention. Commitments under the convention include assisting developing countries in adapting to adverse effects of climate change and technology transfer.

adaptation and vulnerability
GEF or more?

Promised funds for adaptation remain elusive

There is more reason than ever to believe that the worst effects of climate change will take place in the poorest and the most vulnerable parts of the world. The climate convention, in articles 4.8 and 4.9, asks for actions necessary to meet the specific needs of developing countries (including funding, insurance and transfer of technology) regarding adverse effects of climate change or impact of steps taken to counter climate change. The Kyoto Protocol's article 3.14 also calls on annex I (industrialised) countries to minimise adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing countries. It was expected that the details of these provisions would be worked out at CoP-6.

When negotiations finally got serious during the second week, industrialised countries wanted all financial assistance for adaptation to be channelled through the Global Environment Facility (gef). Developing countries opposed this because they find gef too bureaucratic. The issue was referred to a contact group, which was expected to narrow down controversial areas. But the key issues of controversy continued to remain unresolved even after they were referred to the ministerial talks during the second week.

The umbrella group tabled a proposal of its own that offered the creation of a "new window within gef" to fund adaptation and mitigation activities. G77/China opposed this. The umbrella group also wanted the adaptation fund to be part of the proceeds from cdm and voluntary donations, which would amount to industrialised countries fulfilling their commitments by taxing the profits of developing countries from cdm. Pronk's proposal at the fag end of the talks bore several similarities to the draft by the umbrella group. For example, it suggested an adaptation fund under gef, financed from a 2 per cent cut of the share of proceeds from cdm, accommodating the umbrella group proposal. He proposed a convention fund as a new window to gef with new and additional funding for technology transfer. He also proposed that climate change funding be increased "through other channels" to reach a level of us $1 billion over five years. A levy will be applied on joint implementation and emissions trading only if resources in 2005 are found to be less than one billion dollars.

After the Pronk text appeared and negotiators began last-ditch efforts to cut a deal, the issues under this box were relegated to the background with negotiations centring around the us and eu priority areas of sinks and emissions trading. G77/China negotiators, clearly getting sidelined, maintained a stoic silence about the issue.

Developing Countries

Climate Change

Global Warming

UNFCCC