It was a strong anti -adulteration law aimed at the standardising of food stuffs. Stronger industrial lobbies and vested interests helped it die a quiet death
OVER centuries we have written innumerable laws to
protect ourselves from each other's foolishness, negligence,
incompetence or evil. Few of those laws forbid anything
absolutely. Murder we can get away with, in self-defence or
insanity. We can build on floodplains, if we really want to.
The law is strict about robbing banks, but there are plenty of
legal ways to rob the public treasury. Most environmental
laws allow us to poison people just a bit, as long as we claim to
create an economic benefit in the process.
But there were, until recently, two laws that said flatly, "No, this you cannot do." One was the us Endangered Species Act, which did not let you push a creature into extinction. The other was the 'Delaney amendment', which forbade you from adding to foods anything that might cause cancer.
Hated by industry but loved by the public, these laws withstood steady attack by lobbyists, until recently. In this column, I will not go into the many ways the Congress sweeps aside the Endangered Species Act. What I want to do is mark the passing of the Delaney amendment. The Delaney clause, named after Congressperson James Delaney of New York and tacked onto the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act in 1958, said, "the Secretary (of the Food and Drug Administration) shall not approve for use in food, any chemical -additive f@und to induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in animals". Not any. Zero.
From the beginning, this dictum conflicted with another law - the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide and Fungicide Act (FIFRA), passed in 1947. FIFRA could not allow the concept of zero. Pesticides must, by their nature and purpose, be spread around in large quantities. FIFRA assumed that we can administer a dose lethal to the pest but harmless to the applicator and to anyone who might encounter pesticide -tainted air, soil, water or food. Delaney assumed that the only safe dose is zero.
The us Congress papered over that inconsistency by saying that pesticide residues are not food additives. Under FIFRA, the agriculture department (and later the environmental protection agency or the EPA) was supposed to set safe levels of pesticide residues in apples or tomatoes. The Congress did realise a problem, however, with processed foods. Processing could concentrate pesticides into higher amounts than the (assumed safe) raw food tolerances. So, in one of those strange things that bureaucracies do, the Congress specified that in any processed food, if a pesticide becomes concentrated beyond its permitted level in the raw food, then suddenly, it becomes a food additive. If it is a carcinogen (which at least 75 pesticides are), it falls under the Delaney zero. So, a pesticide may be permitted at seven parts per million (ppm) in the apple, but if it goes up to eight ppm in the sauce, then the sauce cannot be sold.
Predictably, pesticide makers and farmers and food processors did not like this law and found many ways around it. They pressed regulators to set high permissible pesticide levels in raw foods so that processed foods would not exceed them and trigger Delaney. They got into a snarl about how much residue can be detected by laboratory instruments. No lab method can prove a concentration of zero, so the Food and Drug Administration, us, decided that a test was good enough if it could find enough'pesticide to cause, say, one cancer in a million people. So mulch for the standard of zero.
Over the years, hard-fought cases moved the policy concerning chemicals in our foods farther away from zero. What evolved was a sloppy policy, based not on zero risk, but on an unclear balance between assumed risk and assumed benefit. The huge uncertainlits behind this policy are described in a recent book by John Wargo, called Our Children's Toxic Legacy (Yale University Press). Wargo sums up the conclusions of a National Academy of Sciences study that tried to assess 30 years of the Delaney clause: ". ..confusing and contradictory legal standards, a virtual nightmare of inadequate data... and the absence of any strategic plan for managing or reducing levels of risk... Clearly, neither the EPA nor the academy knew the extent of carcinogenic risks from pesticides in foods".
The current Congress and President Bill Clinton were just the combination needed to do away at last with the Delaney clause. It had expired quietly this summer when the President signed the 'Food Quality Protection Act of 1996'. Its demise was a symbolic victory for industry, which had actually won the war against zero tolerance long ago. It is probably just as well that the clear, brave languege of Delaney no longer stands to deceive us into thinking that our food supply is risk- free. How much risk there really is, no one knows. How much there will be in the future depends on the new food safety law, and, we must hope, even better ones to come.
Donella H Meadows is an adjunct professor of environmental studies at Dartmouth College, US
We are a voice to you; you have been a support to us. Together we build journalism that is independent, credible and fearless. You can further help us by making a donation. This will mean a lot for our ability to bring you news, perspectives and analysis from the ground so that we can make change together.
Comments are moderated and will be published only after the site moderator’s approval. Please use a genuine email ID and provide your name. Selected comments may also be used in the ‘Letters’ section of the Down To Earth print edition.