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COP29 witnessed a disappointing outcome on climate finance provisions for developing nations — the New Collective Quantifed Goal (NCQG), wherein developed nations set a target of scaling up climate finance commitments from the existing $100 billion per year to $300 billion per year by 2035. Given the enormity of climate finance requirements of developing countries, the outcome signalled the failure of developed countries to fulfill their obligations towards the Global South.
As part of the NCQG outcome, the Baku to Belem Roadmap (B2B Roadmap) was set up by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies to chart a pathway towards mobilising at least $1.3 trillion by 2035 for developing countries' climate needs. This was captured in Paragraph 27 of the NCQG decision, which aims to scale up climate finance “to support low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways and implement nationally determined contributions (NDC) and national adaptation plans, including through grants, concessional and non-debt- creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space…”.
The Presidencies further sought the views of Parties and non-Party stakeholders on overall expectations from the B2B Roadmap, thematic issues that need to be addressed as part of the process, best practices and lessons learned, as well as other multilateral initiatives that can be taken into account for successfully accomplishing the goal of the Roadmap. The Presidencies are expected to submit a summary report on the Roadmap by COP30.
Submission made by Parties since March 2025 reveal fundamental disagreements over how to mobilise $1.3 trillion annually. While developing nations are calling for concrete pathways to deliver more finance through grants and concessional instruments aligned with their national climate plans, developed countries are promoting private-sector mechanisms and voluntary contributions that risk shifting obligations.
Developing country blocs have highlighted the importance of ensuring that climate finance provisions align with the needs and priorities of developing countries. The G77 and China bloc and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) bloc have called for alignment with nationally determined priorities like Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, with G77 arguing that finance must follow developing countries’ self-determined pathways, rather than external conditions. The Like-Minded Developing Countries group (which includes India) have stressed on the exclusion of "international taxes, levies or debt treatment approaches" as violations of national sovereignty. Their submission warned these could "impose negative economic impacts" and shift obligations to developing countries.
The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) have demaned binding targets and a clear climate finance definition — also echoed by the LDC bloc. The Arab Group warned against approaches that reshape obligations from developed countries to developing countries.
The Global South groups emphasised that the Roadmap must ensure equitable geographic balance for financial access. Given the precarity of small island states and least developed countries, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the LDC bloc demanded implementation of predictable, accessible and concessional public and grant-based climate finance, particularly for the most vulnerable. LMDC and the Arab Group also insist that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change must remain the sole platform under consideration for the Roadmap — given its universal representation.
In contrast, developed nations have avoided commitments and frame the Roadmap as a possible pathway to “reach scale”, particularly focusing on private sector investment. The European Union framed the roadmap as a tool to unlock private capital for climate investments.
Japan insisted it should only cover ‘neutral matters’ such as private finance flows. The United Kingdom stressed that the Roadmap must take account of sectors and actors ‘beyond the UNFCCC’, with Canada arguing for building synergies across existing initiatives in the global financial system.
Developing countries propose a number of ways to address systemic barriers that limit their access to the required finance. LMDC demanded the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, arguing that the provision of climate finance from public sources by developed countries is crucial for enabling scaled-up finance.
G77 and China sought a climate finance definition that excludes market rate loans and private finance at market rates of return, as they represent a reverse flow of capital from developing to developed countries. Other areas of concern for G77 and China include enabling just transitions in developing countries and balanced allocation of resources between mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage. The LDC bloc and AOSIS call for tripling adaptation finance by 2030 and increased public finance for loss and damage.
AOSIS also noted the need for direct access modalities and international financial architecture reforms that address systemic barriers such as complex conditionalities and credit rating challenges. AILAC mentioned the expansion of concessional finance, increased adaptation finance, improved loan conditions and enhanced synergies between multilateral development banks for low-cost and accessible financing. The Arab Group highlighted structural inequities: High capital costs, limited fiscal space and foreign exchange risks that deter investment.
Developed nations acknowledged these issues but prioritised enabling environments. The EU proposed discussions on innovative financial instruments, carbon pricing and addressing flows running counter to climate objectives, such as phasing out fossil fuel subsidies — which is also supported by Norway.
The Environmental Integrity Group emphasised domestic reforms such as climate finance taxonomies, ignoring critical concerns such as credit ratings biases and currency risks that deter investments in Global South economies. Country platforms were also touted as a tool for increasing investment by Canada, EU and UK, alongside voluntary carbon markets which receive widespread support from wealthy countries.
In discussing country experiences that can inform the Roadmap, developing nations largely focused on models of direct delivery. AILAC referenced Colombia’s “Heritage Colombia” initiative, which secured $245 million in grants to protect 32 million hectares of critical ecosystems, as well as Costa Rica’s “Marine Payment for Environmental Services” programme, which uses direct payments to conserve mangrove forests. AOSIS draws on the multiple challenges faced by small island states in accessing the required finance and calls for the consideration of debt-for-climate swaps, climate bonds and regional finance mechanisms.
Developed nations, on the other hand, leaned towards market mechanisms. The EU suggested utilising the policy briefs prepared by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action as a source for improving the enabling environment for investments. It also referred to innovative sources of finance from multilateral development banks as well as risk-hedging via local currency lending.
Norway promoted the Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance Coalition’s carbon credit trading model, with Canada proposing de-risking instruments such as green bonds.
In its country submission, India pointed out the linkage between ambitious NDCs and availability of finance to meet the climate needs identified by developing nations — underscoring that enhanced ambition in future NDCs can only be achieved through adequate climate finance. It emphasises country-led approaches to climate action, referring to the “virtuous cycle” of domestic savings and productive investment — further highlighting the link between the Human Development Index and energy access for its citizens.
India also talked about addressing barriers to resource mobilisation by utilising public capital to crowd in private investments. Another concern is increasing the absorptive capacity of developing countries to meet their climate commitments without burdening their fiscal space. For this, it is crucial to limit the dominance of loan financing, ensure additionality of finance, and increase access to technologies at reasonable costs by addressing Intellectual Property Rights barriers, opaque sovereign credit rating methodologies and foreign currency risks.
The Baku to Belém Roadmap spotlights the faultlines between the Global North and Global South. Public finance provisions remain in contention, with developed countries focusing on mobilisation of private funds, instead of provision of public finance. It remains to be seen whether the Presidencies can bring together such divergences into a coherent framework that enables long-term finance flows for the Global South’s growing climate finance needs.