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Developing countries led by the G77 and China seek a new Just Transition Mechanism to anchor equity and support in the global energy transition.
The proposal has triggered strong resistance from developed economies, who warn of duplication and budget strain.
G77 argues the mechanism is vital to move beyond rhetoric, mobilise finance, and support vulnerable nations.
Divisions highlight deeper tensions over responsibility, sovereignty, and the pace of the low-carbon transition.
Outcome of the fight could shape whether just transition remains aspirational—or becomes operational.
The promise of a just transition — a global shift to low-carbon economies rooted in equity, fairness, and international cooperation — has become one of the defining battlegrounds at the 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) being held in Belém, Brazil. Developing countries, led by the Group of 77 and China, have called for a new Just Transition Mechanism under the UN climate framework, a proposal that has exposed sharp divides between the Global South and industrialised economies over finance, governance, and responsibility.
At the inaugural contact group meeting of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) on November 11, Egypt, speaking for the G77 and China, presented the group’s proposal to develop a mechanism that would give institutional weight to the principles of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. It would, the group said, translate just transition from political rhetoric into practical support — coordinating finance, technology transfer, and capacity building across national and international levels.
The proposal was backed by all major developing blocs, including the Independent Alliance of Latin American and the Caribbean Nations (AILAC), the African Group (AG), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Arab Group.
The G77 and China argued that the mechanism must be party-led, bottom-up, inclusive, and non-prescriptive, with a focus on practical implementation and respect for national sovereignty. Its functions would include providing technical assistance, facilitating knowledge exchange, mobilising resources, and identifying support gaps.
“This year is crucial for Just Transition pathways,” Iraq said on behalf of the group. “The COP30 decision must reflect the achievements of the four dialogues and strengthen the Work Programme through the establishment of a Just Transition Mechanism.”
The proposal, developing countries said, seeks to move beyond conceptual discussions to a concrete institutional arrangement under the UNFCCC that could operationalise fairness and equity in the global energy transition. It would ensure that developing nations — already burdened by debt, uneven access to technology, and fragile energy systems — receive the support they need to pursue climate action without stalling growth or livelihoods.
“All dialogues have demonstrated the fundamental role of means of implementation as a prerequisite for climate-resilient pathways,” Iraq noted. “The decision must capture this and ensure the mechanism reflects fairness and equity.”
The G77 and China linked the just transition agenda with other key items at COP30, stressing that it must align with the Loss and Damage Fund, the Santiago Network, and ongoing discussions on response measures, which examine how climate policies affect economies and societies. The group urged that these mechanisms operate in coherence to deliver real benefits for developing countries.
It also warned that trade-restrictive unilateral measures (UTM) imposed by developed nations could undermine developing economies, calling instead for cooperation that “enhances implementation, not creates backsliding.”
China, reinforcing the G77 stance, described the Just Transition as a global responsibility. “Just transition is not the privilege of some countries but the shared pursuit of humankind,” the Chinese delegate said. “The most important role now is to establish an international regime that facilitates global actions.” It also emphasised that a global mechanism could enhance coordination, accelerate sustainable development, and strengthen climate governance, while guarding against trade barriers that “create new imbalances” for the developing world.
India, speaking for the LMDC, echoed the call for a mechanism rooted in justice and inclusion. “Transitions can very easily be unjust,” the Indian delegate said. “They can deny those who have contributed the least to climate change the right to develop, and burden them with unfair mitigation costs.”
India urged that the JTWP be designed to integrate the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and ensure that transitions are people-centred and whole-of-economy. It welcomed the forthcoming Technology Implementation Programme, calling it crucial to driving technology access and enabling developing countries to achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
Nigeria, aligning with the G77 and China, added that just transition “must begin and end with people.” It called for dedicated financial windows within the Green Climate Fund to help resource-dependent economies diversify and adapt, as well as for concessional finance to unlock private investment in renewable energy and sustainable industries.
However, the proposal met resistance from developed economies, including Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and the Environmental Integrity Group. They argued that creating a new mechanism would duplicate existing institutions under the Paris Agreement and add bureaucratic complexity. Instead, they urged that the Just Transition Work Programme advance its work through existing modalities, institutions, and funding frameworks.
Norway warned that a new body could take up to five years to become operational, diverting resources from immediate needs. It noted that less than 50 per cent of activities under the UNFCCC’s core budget are currently funded and said any new institutional arrangement would deepen financial strain. “It will be much more efficient to use mechanisms that Parties have already established under the Paris Agreement,” Norway said, suggesting that the JTWP instead guide existing bodies such as the Technology Mechanism.
The European Union and the United Kingdom (UK) also questioned the proposal’s added value, seeking clarity on its unique function and relevance. “It is unclear how the suggested mechanism would avoid duplication,” the EU said, urging Parties to “capitalise on the substantive work” done in previous dialogues.
The UK added that just transition discussions must reflect both ambition — the destination — and the journey, warning against using the concept to “reduce ambition or delay the 1.5°C goal.”
Japan insisted that any decision must align with the temperature target, calling for a “mapping of all existing initiatives” and a financial assessment before considering new structures. Australia echoed these concerns, warning that new mechanisms could “strain resources” and overlap with at least 50 existing just transition-related initiatives. Both Australia and Canada backed a mapping exercise to identify existing work and strengthen coordination rather than expanding the institutional architecture.
Behind these arguments lies a broader North–South fault line over finance, control, and timing. Developed nations — already reluctant to scale up climate finance commitments — expressed concern about the budgetary implications of a new body, preferring to channel just transition work through existing institutions. Developing countries, in turn, argued that this position reveals a lack of political will to deliver on equity and shared responsibility.
For the Global South, the Just Transition Mechanism is not just an institutional proposal but a political necessity. It represents a bid to bring equity, justice, and developmental realities into the core of global climate governance. “Transitions must be fair, inclusive, and cognizant of historical responsibility,” said one negotiator from the African Group. “Without a mechanism to ensure support, the idea of a ‘just’ transition risks becoming another empty phrase.”
Even some developed countries sought to temper the divide. Australia, while opposing a new institutional structure, acknowledged that “international cooperation is essential to turn ambition into implementation.” It said the JTWP should help countries embed just transition principles into NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAP), and Long-Term Low-Emission Strategies (LT-LEDs)—ensuring that the transition strengthens local economies rather than disrupts them.
As negotiations continue, the G77 and China’s push has emerged as one of the most closely watched debates of COP30. The outcome could define whether the idea of just transition remains a guiding principle—or becomes a functional mechanism capable of channelling real finance and technology support to developing nations.
“The mechanism we propose,” Iraq said, closing the G77’s intervention, “would place international cooperation and multilateralism at its core, enabling developing countries to pursue climate action without sacrificing growth or livelihoods.”
Whether developed nations agree remains uncertain. But in Belém, one message rang clear: without fairness, funding, and solidarity, there can be no just transition — only another promise deferred.