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India’s April 2026 power surge exposed both the promise and limits of its clean-energy push: solar briefly met a third of demand, but coal still stabilised the grid and deficits persisted.
The article argues India’s transition must be “just” — protecting coal-dependent workers, states and revenues through early planning, diversification and a new Centre–state compact, not just adding renewables.
On April 24-25, 2026, India’s power system offered a glimpse of both the promise and the complexity of the country’s energy transition. Amid an intense heatwave, electricity demand surged to 252 GW and then to a record 256 GW. During peak solar hours, renewable energy performed remarkably well, with solar generation reaching 80.8 GW and meeting nearly one-third of national demand. For a few hours, India appeared to be powering its growth through clean energy.
Yet, as evening approached, the picture changed. Solar generation declined while demand remained high. In the absence of adequate storage and grid flexibility, coal-fired power plants once again became the backbone of the system, supplying nearly two-thirds of total generation. Gas-based plants stepped in to manage fluctuations despite their higher costs. Even then, the country recorded power deficits of 5.4 GW and 4.2 GW on the two days.
These events highlight a fundamental reality: India’s energy transition is not simply about replacing coal with renewable energy. It is about managing a complex economic and social transformation while maintaining energy security, employment and regional development.
India has made remarkable progress in renewable energy. Innovative projects such as the Rewa Solar Park and the Morena storage initiatives in Madhya Pradesh have demonstrated leadership in clean energy deployment, cost efficiency and investment mobilisation. Non-fossil sources now account for more than half of India’s installed electricity capacity, placing the country ahead of its Paris Agreement trajectory. The target of 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 appears increasingly achievable.
However, beneath this success lies a deeper challenge. Coal still provides more than 70 per cent of India’s electricity generation despite accounting for less than half of installed capacity. More importantly, coal is not merely a fuel. It is the economic foundation of large parts of eastern and central India and a critical source of livelihoods for millions of households.
India produces more than one billion tonnes of coal annually and operates around 230 GW of coal-based thermal power capacity. Across mining, transportation, power generation, equipment manufacturing and ancillary industries, millions depend directly or indirectly on the fossil-fuel economy. A significant share of this workforce is informal, with limited social protection, weak labour security and few alternative employment opportunities.
This raises a critical question: can India achieve its climate and development goals while ensuring that workers and communities dependent on coal are not left behind?
The answer lies in embracing a just transition.
A just transition is often viewed narrowly as a climate agenda. In reality, it is a social, economic and developmental imperative. The principle is straightforward: environmental justice cannot be achieved without social justice. If climate action generates unemployment, economic insecurity or new forms of exclusion, it risks losing political legitimacy.
India’s challenge is also shaped by a federal paradox. The authority over energy and mining largely rests with the Union government, but the social and economic consequences of both extraction and decarbonisation are concentrated in a handful of coal-producing states. Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal have powered India’s industrialisation for decades. Yet many coal-bearing districts in these states continue to rank among the country’s most economically vulnerable regions.
As India moves towards a low-carbon future, a new asymmetry is emerging. The benefits of decarbonisation — energy security, technological innovation, industrial competitiveness and climate resilience — are national. The adjustment costs, however, are local. They will be borne disproportionately by workers, communities and state governments in coal-dependent regions.
This raises important questions of distributive federalism. How will states compensate for declining coal revenues? Who will finance economic diversification in coal districts? How will workers and local governments be supported through the transition? And how can coal-bearing states secure a meaningful stake in the emerging clean-energy economy?
These questions cannot be answered through renewable energy targets alone. They require a new policy compact between the Centre and the states, one that recognises the uneven geography of both energy production and energy transition.
International experiences offer valuable lessons, but they also demonstrate why India’s pathway must be distinct.
Germany’s Ruhr region is frequently cited as a successful example of post-coal transformation. Yet this transition unfolded over several decades and involved public investments exceeding €200 billion. It was supported by strong institutions, social dialogue, labour protections, vocational training systems and long-term industrial policy.
South Africa and Indonesia, both major coal economies, have also begun navigating just transition pathways. Their experiences show that balancing decarbonisation with employment, regional development and social justice is far more complex than replacing one energy source with another.
India faces an even greater challenge. Unlike many advanced economies, it must simultaneously pursue economic development, poverty reduction and decarbonisation. It cannot simply phase down fossil industries and address the social consequences later.
Livelihood transitions and energy transitions must proceed together.
The first priority is economic diversification. Renewable energy projects alone will not absorb the workforce currently dependent on coal. Moreover, many coal-producing states have relatively limited renewable resource potential compared with western and southern India. New opportunities must emerge through manufacturing, logistics, agro-processing, circular economy industries, services and other employment-intensive sectors.
Second, post-mining landscapes should be viewed as development assets rather than liabilities. Across India, large areas of mining land will eventually become available for alternative uses. These lands could support industrial clusters, manufacturing zones, logistics parks, ecological restoration projects and community enterprises. Strategic land repurposing can become a powerful tool for regional economic restructuring.
A promising idea is the creation of “Special Employment Zones” in former mining regions. Unlike traditional industrial corridors, such zones would focus explicitly on employment generation and economic diversification without requiring large-scale new land acquisition. Current approaches often prioritise eco-parks and water reservoirs. While valuable from an environmental perspective, they do little to address future employment needs or replace district-level revenues.
Third, India requires stronger institutional mechanisms to coordinate the transition. Energy transition is not solely the responsibility of the Union Ministries of Power, Coal or New and Renewable Energy. It also involves labour, industry, finance, environment, rural development, tribal affairs and state governments. A whole-of-government approach is essential.
Most importantly, planning must begin now. Waiting until mines become economically unviable or power plants approach retirement will significantly increase social and fiscal costs. Early preparedness is the most effective form of transition policy.
The challenge before India is not whether it should transition. The transition is already underway. The challenge is whether it can do so in a manner that is fair, inclusive and politically sustainable.
The events of April 2026 demonstrate that renewable energy is becoming central to India’s future. They also remind us that coal continues to underpin grid stability, industrial production, state revenues and livelihoods.
Climate goals and economic justice should not be viewed as competing priorities. They are mutually reinforcing. A transition that secures livelihoods, supports vulnerable regions and creates new economic opportunities will strengthen public support for climate action. A transition that neglects these realities risks deepening inequalities and generating resistance.
India’s energy transition is therefore not merely a technological project. It is one of the most significant exercises in economic restructuring and regional transformation since Independence. Its success will be judged not only by the number of solar panels installed or emissions reduced, but by whether it creates a more equitable future for the millions whose lives and livelihoods have long been tied to the fossil-fuel economy.
The communities that powered India’s past must have a meaningful place in its future.
Shashi Ratnaker Singh is with the Department of Geography, University of Cambridge; Bhaskar Vira is Senior Pro Vice Chancellor at the University of Cambridge and Ashwani Kumar is Chairperson at the Centre for Public Policy, TISS, Mumbai.
Views expressed are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth