‘Goal shouldn’t be to push fertility up or down’

Snigdha Das (SD): What does the difference between rural and urban fertility levels signify?

Poonam Muttreja (PM): National Family Health Survey-6 (NFHS-6) shows rural total fertility rate (TFR) at 2.1 compared to 1.6 in urban India. This gap is not simply about geography. It reflects unequal access to education, health, livelihoods, information and women’s agency. Urban fertility is lower because of late marriage, higher education levels, greater exposure to information, higher cost of living, better access to health services and contraception, and different aspirations around family size. An additional factor is selective migration. Urban areas attract younger, better educated and more economically mobile individuals who are more likely to delay marriage, use contraception, and choose smaller families. Rural India still faces stronger pressures around early marriage, son preference, unpaid care work, limited mobility and uneven access to quality reproductive health services.

SD: Will a low TFR affect India’s demographic dividend?

PM: A lower TFR will gradually change India’s age structure. India still has a large working-age population, but the window to fully realise the demographic dividend is narrowing. Our projections show that India’s elderly population will rise from 9.6 per cent in 2021 to 20.4 per cent by 2051. This means India must prepare for ageing while still investing in young people. The key challenge is not the decline in fertility itself, but whether India can create decent jobs, improve skills, and strengthen health systems and increase women’s workforce participation. Without these investments, the demographic dividend can be lost.

SD: Why some states continue to have TFRs above the national average?

PM: States with higher TFR often face a combination of lower female education, higher child marriage, higher unmet need for family planning, poorer health access, poverty and weaker women’s decision-making power. NFHS-6 shows Bihar at 2.7, and Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and Meghalaya at 2.2. These states need sustained investment in girls’ education, adolescent health, child marriage prevention, nutrition, voluntary family planning and quality reproductive healthcare. The answer is not coercion or targets. Fertility falls naturally when girls stay in school, women are healthy, child survival improves, and couples can access information and services without pressure.

SD: What are your views on the decline of TFR as a reflection of progresses on multiple fronts?

PM: The decline in TFR should not be seen only as a family planning outcome. It reflects broader social change, including women’s growing aspirations and the gradual shift towards smaller, planned families. It reflects long-term improvements in child survival, women’s education, access to contraception, urbanisation, delayed marriage in many regions, and changing aspirations among families. Couples increasingly want to invest more in fewer children, especially in education, health and mobility.

SD: Is India becoming more equitable in terms of reproductive rights?

PM: Falling fertility does not automatically mean reproductive justice. NFHS-6 shows that unmet need for family planning remains high in states such as Meghalaya, Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh. Modern contraceptive use has declined, while traditional method use has increased. Male sterilisation remains only 0.5 per cent, which shows that the burden of contraception still falls overwhelmingly on women. Many women also face pressure around early marriage, childbearing, son preference, mobility and decision-making. So, the question is: Whether women are making free, informed and supported choices.

SD: What is the link between low fertility and the rise in women’s participation in the workforce?

PM: The relationship between the two is not a simple cause-and-effect one; it is shaped by the broader social and economic environment. We examined these inter-linkages between population dynamics, women’s empowerment and development across Indian states. Our findings challenge a common assumption. We often believe that as economies grow, incomes rise and education improves, women’s empowerment will naturally follow. But development creates opportunity; it does not automatically create agency.

Not a single major Indian state ranks “high” on the Women’s Empowerment Index, despite decades of economic growth. This helps explain why fertility decline alone does not guarantee higher female labour force participation. As women study more, work more and develop economic aspirations, they often delay marriage and childbearing and prefer smaller families. At the same time, low fertility can create an opportunity for greater women’s workforce participation, because women may spend fewer years in repeated pregnancy and childcare. But this opportunity is not automatic. If childcare, safe transport, flexible work, parental leave and shared caregiving are absent, women may still be forced out of work. India cannot realise its demographic dividend without a gender dividend. Supporting women’s economic participation is, therefore, not simply a consequence of fertility decline. It is one of the most important policy responses to it.

SD: Is low fertility a cause for alarm?

PM: We must avoid moving from being panicked about “too many people” to about “too few children”. Both narratives place the burden of demographic change on women. India’s population story is now about regional diversity, inequality, ageing, reproductive autonomy and care. High-fertility regions need one set of investments; low-fertility and ageing regions need another, including childcare, infertility care, geriatric services and care economy planning. The goal should not be to push fertility up or down. The goal should be to help people realise their reproductive aspirations freely, safely and with dignity.

This interview is part of the cover story “India’s sudden baby bust”, originally published in the September 1-15, 2026 print edition of Down To Earth