The world’s most populous country is in a demographic quagmire. India’s birth rate is falling at a baffling pace. The dip is being grudgingly celebrated as the ultimate population control success. For the world, which is seeing a similar decline in birth rate, the news from India has symbolised a defusing of the proverbial population bomb that had been ticking ever since the 18th century English cleric-economist Thomas Malthus propounded his ideas on the dangers of unchecked population growth.
The recently released sixth round of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6) puts India’s total fertility rate (TFR) at 2.0. This is below the replacement level of 2.1, which is the average number of children a woman needs to have in her reproductive age (15-49 years) to maintain the population level. TFR above the replacement level means population growth, while that below means population decline. This is the second consecutive round of NFHS when the national TFR has remained same. The previous round, NFHS-5 (2019-21), had also recorded the same TFR of 2.0.
According to NFHS-6, a total of 28 states and Union Territories have fertility rates below the replacement level, while 26 states and Union Territories have fertility rates even below the national average of 2.0. Only seven states and Union Territories—Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Uttar Pradesh and Lakshadweep—have TFR at or above the replacement level of 2.1. There is also a significant gap between rural and urban fertility rates. While the TFR for urban areas is 1.6, the figure for rural areas stands at 2.1. Bihar has the country’s highest TFR of 2.7 while Andaman and Nicobar the lowest at 0.9. Earlier, in May, the “Sample Registration System Statistical Report 2024”, published by the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, estimated the country’s TFR to be 1.9 in 2024. That year, Bihar recorded the highest TFR (2.9), while Delhi had the lowest (1.2).
According to the UN population reports, India’s fertility rate—from more than five children in 1950 to two children now—has dipped faster than the global average. The country has reached below replacement-level fertility fastest among the nations that have reached this threshold. India’s current fertility rate nearly compares with that of the developed countries of the world.
The country’s birth rate has been dipping over decades. But in recent years it has witnessed a steep decline. Across the six NFHS rounds starting from the first one in 1992-93, TFR has been on a slide: from 3.4 in the first round to 2.2 in the fourth round. For the first time, it slipped below the replacement level in the fifth round. The number of birth per year has been declining—from around 23.5 million in 2020 to 23 million in 2025—and is projected to decline consistently. Moradhvaj Dhakad, a researcher at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, while speaking to The Indian Express, said that India achieving below replacement rate fertility now was not expected now but in 2030-35.
However, the low fertility rate will not immediately result in population decline. The population will continue to grow due to the phenomena known as demographic momentum, which happens due to the age structure of the people. If a country has a huge young demography, the population grows as youngsters grow and have children, even if each individual has fewer babies. In India, the number of women in reproductive age had been increasing until 2011. Even now, females under the age of 14 years account for one-fourth of India’s population. This demographic momentum is estimated to contribute around 70 per cent of the current population growth.
Nonetheless, the dipping fertility rate heralds a phase of population stabilisation—the precursor to population decline. “India is set to witness a sharp slowdown in population growth in the next two decades. Although the country as a whole will enjoy the demographic dividend phase, some States which are in the advanced stage of demographic transition will witness transition to an ageing society as early as 2030s,” stated “Economic Survey 2018-19”. Population projections at the national and state levels up to 2041 show that India has entered the next stage of demographic transition, with population growth set to slow sharply in the next two decades.
“Economic Survey 2018-19” also said that “both the trajectory of population and population growth will vary across States. States ahead in the demographic transition will witness a continued deceleration in population growth and reach near-zero growth rates by 2031-41. States lagging behind in the demographic transition will also witness a marked slowdown in population growth during 2021-41”.
The age bracket of 0-19 years is already past its “peak”. This age group’s share in total population is set to be just 25 per cent in 2041, from 41 per cent in 2011. Share of the elderly population (60 years and above) will steadily rise—from 8.6 per cent in 2011 to 16 per cent in 2041. Various estimates indicate that the current annual working-age population growth of 9.7 million will more than half to 4.2 million per year during 2031-41. According to a population projection for 2021-2051 by the International Institute of Migration and Development, Kerala, the number of children (0-14 age group) will come down to 322 million by 2031 from 341 million in 2021. In the decade after that, it would further come down by 34 million and by 2051, it will see another dip of 22 million.
The first tentative sign of this demographic shift can be sniffed from the school enrolments. A peek into the data of the India’s Unified District Information System for Education Plus, popularly addressed as UDISE+, show how it is unfolding. According to its data released in August 2025, there is a 2.08 million drop in enrolment across standard I to XII—from 234.97 million in 2023-24 to 232.89 million in 2024-25. This is the country’s lowest enrolment in the past seven years. It is also noteworthy that in standards I to V, enrolment declined by 17.46 million in the past seven years.
Based on historical data, demographers have a trajectory for population transitions with three distinct phases: (i) high birth and death rates; (ii) high birth and low death rate (population increases); and (iii) low birth and death rate (population stabilises). Each phase is defined by socio-economic progressions, particularly relevant to women’s societal and economic status. According to demographers and experts with the UN, currently two-thirds of world population lives in countries with below replacement level fertility. UN demographers also say that India is in transition to the third phase. The country’s birth rate dip can be analysed through other countries’ journey through this trajectory.
Dip in nations’ TFR was first registered in the 1960s, when the world was still obsessive of the Malthusian warning. In just a few decades, a significant number of countries recorded decline in fertility. Africa which currently has a high TFR, has also been recording declining birth rate. In developed countries—which were the first block of nations to achieve below replacement-level fertility rate—the reasons contributing to low birth rate were said to be high income growth; extensive healthcare; marriage failures; women empowerment through high education; increase in women workforce; and women having the agency to have children late in life.
On all these parameters, India still lags behind. Among the Asian countries that had similar experiences, like Japan and China, India does not match on one parameter—economic status. Japan had below replacement fertility rate in 1957 when its economic status was worse than India’s current status. Nations like Japan, Korea and China also experienced rapid economic growth (read high industrial growth) in the periods that saw dipping fertility rates. India, on other hand, cannot be said to have experienced that level of growth now or in past decades. So, what explains the dipping fertility rate in India?
A dip fertility rate is evidently correlated to women empowerment, income and education, besides the state of reproductive health indicators like access to contraception, low infant mortality, childcare prevalence, early child birth decision, and spacing between child births. Analysis of NFHS-5 data on fertility clearly establishes a correlation—states like Goa, Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh that have low TFR score very high on composite women’s empowerment index. On other hand, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which have high fertility rate, score low on the same index.
One can make this correlation on a historical timeline as well. For example, in 1960, the average Indian woman had six children. This was the same period when “less than 1 in 4 [women] used some form of contraception, and less than 1 in 2 had attended primary school”, shows UN and World Bank data.
The age of marriage is critical to birth rate. It reflect girls’ access to education, safety, nutrition, family support, bodily autonomy, and the power to make decisions about their life. In case of India, with a significant women population of reproductive age, this condition is even more defining. However, child marriage is still widespread in India. According to NFHS-6, more than one-fifth of women in the age group of 20-24 were married off before they attained the age of 18, the official minimum marriage age. Adolescent pregnancy rate is static at 6.7 per cent. Here is another telling correlation—states having higher than replacement-level fertility rate also had a higher percentage of women married before the age of 18.
Going by NFHS-6, the percentage of married women using contraceptive has increased from 66.7 per cent in last survey to 69.1 per cent. However, the use of modern methods has declined from 56.4 per cent to 52.7 per cent. At the same time, the percentage of married women using traditional contraceptive method has increased from 10.3 per cent to 16.4 per cent. There is another parameter that indicates either lack of access to contraception or the lack of power to take decision on planning a family: “unmet need”. NFHS defines it as, “Unmet need for family planning refers to fecund women who are not using contraception but who wish to postpone the next birth (spacing) or stop childbearing altogether (limiting).” The unmet need for family planning has recorded statistically insignificant decline between the two NFHSs: from 9.4 per cent to 8.5 per cent. States with high TFR invariably have higher unmet need level, like Meghalaya (21 per cent); Bihar (14.4 per cent); Jharkhand (12.6 per cent). On the other hand, in Uttar Pradesh, the number stands at 10.8 per cent.
In India, women largely bear the contraception burden, which points at gender inequality. Only 0.5 per cent married men opted for sterilisation, according to NFHS-6. Various estimates using the NFHS-5 data say that this unmet contraceptive need accounted for one-fourth of population growth during this survey time period.
Lastly, women labour force is still low in India. Nearly 43 per cent of women remain outside the work force as they still devote to unpaid domestic and other family-related activities. This can be used to argue that the dip in fertility rate would have been steeper if the influencing conditions were better than current levels.
Is there a societal change fuelling Indians’ increasing subscription to small family or even opting for not having children? Only four states have TFR above the replacement level, and in rest of the states people are just refusing to have even a small family of two children. To understand what is driving this, and whether women have gained power and autonomy over family planning decisions, Down To Earth spoke a large number of families across nine states. The conversation targeted couples married for a decade but having a maximum of two children. The interactions, which covered couples from both urban and rural areas, examined a wide array of questions: from infant mortality dip to education level to cost of living crisis to decision-making power of women in planning a family. Importantly, the conversations deep-dived into the couples’ parent generation and the kind of family size they had.
The discussions also included if there is a change in the way couples think about children. It is widely regarded that earlier children were treated as “economic assets”. Did the old socio-economic norms encourage and incentivise large family? Has this changed? The conversations bring out the multi-layered ecosystem in which couples now make family-planning decisions. In just one generation, many couples say, the average family size has reduced by 60-70 per cent—from parenting six-seven children to around two children. Many couples from rural and remote geographies say that since infant mortality has come down drastically, they could have fewer children and be assured of their higher survival rate. Add to it the advantage of a near-universal birth in hospitals that ensures medical supervision.
Many couples emphasised the collapse of the joint family, which has led to more responsibilities on parents to raise children. This is further accentuated by the rising cost of living and raising children. Nearly all couples gave rising cost as the prime reason for opting small family size. One key variable on which no clear answer emerged was education as a factor in couples having a small family. But many couples did hint that it is a factor. Most couples from economically disadvantaged background said that having more children as “economic assets” was no more the consideration.
“Poverty has no link to having more children. It is all about current situations linked to raising a child,” said one couple. On the other hand, women’s education and participation in workforce emerged as a important factors in family planning decisions.
H M Siddaraju, director of the Directorate of Health Services, Andaman and Nicobar, which has the country’s lowest fertile rate, cites several reasons for the decline. He tells DTE that many couples are satisfied with one child and want a small family. Access to modern family-planning methods has become easier; and improvements in socio-economic status and higher literacy rates among women are also contributing factors to the decline, he adds. Linguist Anvita Abbi, who has worked extensively among tribal communities, tells DTE that the islands are largely a middle-class society and suggests that factors such as economic independence and education may be contributing to the declining fertility rate. “Everyone here is educated, and unemployment is low,” she says.
The Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir has recorded an increase in TFR, though it is still below the replacement rate: from 1.4 in NFHS-5 to 1.8 in the latest one. An official posted at the Population Research Centre in Srinagar tells DTE that the reasons for the decline of TFR in Jammu and Kashmir are similar to those seen in other states. He considers improvement in the level of education and the breakdown of joint families to be the main reasons. However, gynaecologist Andleeb Abdullah, who works at Gousia Government Hospital in Khanyar, Srinagar, directly links the Union Territory’s social, economic and political situation to the low TFR. She says that Jammu and Kashmir has seen conflicts for more than 30 years, which has had a very adverse impact on the economic situation. She adds that living continuously in a conflict zone increases stress, which also has a direct impact on the fertility rate.
According to her, the weak economic situation has reduced the spending capacity of the middle and lower-middle classes, and in such a situation, people do not want to have more children. The weak economic situation is also causing delays in marriage. Abdullah further says that after completing education, girls now give priority to jobs, which is leading to delays in marriage. The same is true of men. Because of delayed marriages, women’s fertility period is becoming shorter. This is also an important reason for the low TFR, according to her. “The decline should not be seen only as a family planning outcome. It reflects broader social change, including women’s growing aspirations and the gradual shift towards smaller, planned families,” explains Poonam Muttreja, executive director of Population Foundation of India, a Delhi-based non-profit.
Joymoti Kumari, an Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) worker in Rampur, Assam, who has been serving the villages of Rajapukhuri and Nathpara for 20 years, says she is witnessing a change in attitude of couples. In the past decade, she has observed couples limiting family to one child, regardless of whether the child is a boy or a girl. “People have realised that, in today’s social and economic environment, a small family is the most practical choice. Women are also playing a greater role in family decision-making,” she says. ASHA workers regularly monitor the health of pregnant women and newborns, which has contributed to the decline in infant mortality. “When people know that their children are very likely to survive, they no longer feel the need to have larger families,” she says.
Economic demographers Dean Spears and Micahel Geruso, whose book After the Spike: Population, Progress, and the Case for People was released in 2025, corroborate the trend of smaller families now being common. “In NFHS-5, young women in Uttar Pradesh told surveyors that they want an average of 1.9 children. A future where women in Uttar Pradesh are having 1.9 children, on average, is probably a future where people elsewhere are having even fewer,” they tell DTE, “For a long time, India was at the centre of fears about ‘overpopulation’. Today, lives in India are richer than ever. They are longer than ever. They are healthier than ever. So ‘overpopulation’ did not bring doom to India,” they say.
For its “State of the World Population Report 2025”, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) conducted an online survey of 14,000 adults across 14 countries including India. A UNFPA news article says that among the respondents to the survey, those “who reported having or wanting children, the most commonly cited challenges were economic, ranging from financial insecurity and unemployment to inadequate housing and limited access to quality childcare”. In India, “over 36 per cent of respondents reported an unintended pregnancy, while over 30 per cent were unable to have a child when they wished to,” the article said. “This reflects a dual challenge: Underachieved fertility, where people have fewer children than desired and overachieved fertility, where they have more children than they intended,” the article adds.
Another trend that UNFPA’s “World Fertility Report, 2024” identifies as a reason for dipping fertility rate in India is the decline of early childbearing. “In India, many educated, working individuals from higher income groups are marrying in their late 20s or early 30s and having their first child soon after,” says the UNFPA news article. “When it comes to a second child, spacing practices—critical for maternal, child and societal health—are overlooked,” it adds.
While it is clear that women are increasingly having a final say on family planning, they are often not sure of the number of children they want. This fact comes out in the UNFPA report. On a question on whether they know of the “ideal” family size, many showed hesitation. The UNFPA survey says, “22 per cent of respondents of reproductive age indicated ‘don’t know’ or ‘prefer not to say’ when asked their ideal number of children, and 35 per cent were unable to say how many children they expected to have, indicating that the experience of uncertainty is extremely common, yet it is not well researched.”
“For many of our ancestors on the path up the [population] Spike, parenting might not have felt like much of a decision at all—it was part of a life. But it’s a decision now. Because it’s a decision, people will be thinking about the benefits and thinking about the costs. They might not use those exact words, unless they happen to be economists. But they’ll be weighing the consequences implicitly when they ask themselves: What do I want to achieve with my life? What do I want to be in my life? As long as options compete with and crowd out each other (which is to say, always), people will consider opportunity costs,” write Spears and Geruso write in After the Spike.
In 2023 India became the world’s most populous country surpassing China. It was in 2019 that Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his Independence Day speech flagged “population explosion” as a crisis.
Since the country’s disastrous experience of forced family planning during the Emergency period in the 1970s, population control remains a political pariah. But Modi brought it back to agenda. In just six years, the concern has moved from explosion to a contraction demanding a reset to avoid a future with less working people and more old population to take care of. Some 76 years after India became the first country in the world to have a national family planning programme, declining birth is the new headline. The dipping TFR has just exploded as a one of the most unexpected turn in India’s demographic change. As the “Economic Survey 2018-19” says, “Some states will start transitioning to an ageing society by the 2030s.”
The global situation is not much different. By 2050, the UN projection shows, only eight countries—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines and the United Republic of Tanzania—will account for 50 per cent of the population growth. Such is the depopulation phenomenon in the world’s high-income countries that the UN’s “World Population Prospects” report of 2022 said, “Over the next few decades, migration will be the sole driver of population growth in high-income countries, as the number of deaths will progressively exceed the number of births.” For the first time, the UN in its report visualised the consequence of the population decline: “If this (population decline) continues, whole countries or even the human population itself could collapse.”