The completion of Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has reignited tensions over Nile water rights, with Egypt and Sudan fearing reduced water flows.
While Ethiopia celebrates the dam as a clean energy symbol, experts warn of ecological impacts and diplomatic challenges.
The controversy highlights the complex balance between energy development and ecological sustainability in a climate-stressed world.
The completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydropower project, has reignited long-standing tensions over Nile river water rights between Egypt, Sudan and other neighbouring countries. Besides being praised as a symbol of clean energy and national pride by Ethiopia, which contributes over 80+ per cent of Nile water, the $4 billion mega structure also magnifies one of the most pressing dilemmas of our time. Can mega-hydropower projects still be considered ‘green’ in an era of climate uncertainty, ecological fragility, and contested resources?
As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, keen on making his country Africa’s biggest electricity exporter, announced completion of the construction to Ethiopia’s parliament, diplomatic and ecological ripple effects were almost immediate. The news saw downstream nations like Egypt and Sudan renew their fierce opposition, calling for regional and global intervention.
Egypt, in particular, regards the dam as an existential threat, fearing that reduced water flows during drought seasons will devastate its food production systems and imperil the livelihoods of millions. Smaller voices, especially those of smallholder farmers, fisherfolk and river-dependent communities across the Nile basin, haven’t been drowned by state-centric/diplomatic rhetoric and narratives.
Speaking to local press, Makhluf Kassema, a 55-year-old Egyptian farmer from the outskirts of Fayoum town, complained that the dam, with its 74 billion cubic metre capacity, will deeply affect farming communities and other livelihoods that rely on the Nile.
“The decision to construct the dam was made without any societal dialogue and without taking the opinion of the very people whose lives are affected by it,” complained Kassema, adding “farmers are more concerned with securing food for Egyptians because their lives depend on it.”
Several other related complaints have been registered elsewhere in the county and in neighbouring countries like Sudan, highlighting the fears of thousands of farmers and other stakeholders across the Nile basin, which includes Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, DRC Rwanda and Burundi.
Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Sudan’s military chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met earlier this week and “stressed their rejection of any unilateral measures in the Blue Nile basin”, local media in Sudan reported. “We are warning our brothers in Ethiopia, to not touch a drop of Egypt’s water because all our options are open,” the Egyptian president is quoted as having warned.
Diplomatic negotiations between Ethiopia and Egypt over the years have not led to a pact, and questions remain about how much water Ethiopia will release downstream in case of a drought. Ethiopia and Egypt have tried to strike an agreement over the years but in vain, with neighbouring countries fearing that the completion of the dam and the full swing consequences of the move might take the two countries to war over it.
So far, Ethiopia is seemingly winning the diplomatic support of upstream nations in the Nile basin, with an accord on the equitable use of water resources from the Nile river being inked. Unfortunately, the accord of the partnership, known as the Nile Basin Initiative, came into force last year without the ratification of Egypt or Sudan.
Experts are concerned that the completion of GERD is poised to trigger profound ecological shifts along the Nile river and further downstream. A common complaint has been that messing up such a vast river inevitably alters seasonal flow and fish migration patterns, among other ecological catastrophes. What’s more, multiple studies on similar mega-dam projects worldwide have shown how river fragmentation often leads to habitat loss, biodiversity decline, and changes in water chemistry. These impacts unfold over time and are difficult to reverse. Moreover, with climate models projecting more erratic rainfall and prolonged droughts like more recent ones in East Africa, the dam’s impact on the Nile’s resilience becomes more troubling, according to climate experts.
PM Abiy insisted that GERD is essential for uplifting millions of his citizens out of poverty, powering industries with green energy and exporting surplus electricity to neighbours in the Nile basin. When operational at full capacity, GERD will generate over 6,000 megawatts, doubling Ethiopia’s energy output and cementing its status as a regional power hub, according to state sources.
Yet, we all must ask. Is clean energy truly ‘clean’ if its production disrupts the ecological integrity of a trans-boundary river system and jeopardises food and water security? This rhetorical tension between energy justice and ecological justice is at the heart of the GERD controversy. And it raises broader questions about sustainability frameworks that fail to account for long-term ecological costs.
This paradox also reminds us that hydropower, which was once the poster child of green development, must be re-evaluated. Unlike wind or solar, large-scale hydropower often comes with heavy trade-offs, especially in ecologically sensitive or politically complex basins like the Nile.
The genesis of the GERD conflict has a longstanding historical background. Egypt and Sudan have always cited colonial-era water-sharing agreements, particularly the 1929 and 1959 treaties, which granted them almost exclusive rights to the Nile’s waters. Ethiopia, which was not party to the water treaties, has repeatedly rejected their legitimacy, just as other upstream countries like Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC and South Sudan.
Should such 20th-century agreements, drafted of imperial logic and demographic realities of that era, still govern water use in a 21st-century climate-changed world? Why would slightly over 100 million Egyptians retain veto power over the water needs of over 300 million people across upstream nations in the Nile basin? These are not just legal questions; they are moral, ecological and existential.
All in all, if the GERD wrangles are anything to go by, then water diplomacy between nations must evolve beyond rigid legalism and unilateral action, to be more inclusive and with ecological considerations. Calls for both regional and global interventions by Egypt and others have seen the US President Donald Trump express his intention to help solve the dispute. During a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the White House this week, Trump said: “I think if I were Egypt, I would want the water to reach the Nile river, and we’re working on that. It’s a problem.”
Diplomats, ministers of water and foreign affairs from Egypt, Sudan and other neighbouring countries, negotiating and offering mediation have made several proposals, with three standing out. First, they have been calling for institutionalisation of Nile basin governance, putting in place a sort of ‘Basin Authority’. They want the key players empowered to oversee joint management, data sharing, and environmental monitoring.
They are also calling for ecological accounting in water deals/treaties, saying water-sharing agreements must consider not only cubic metres and megawatts but also ecological thresholds, biodiversity and cultural water use. Also, the mediators want trans-boundary climate adaptation plans in place. They reason that with climate shocks increasingly likely, basin states must collaborate on coordinated drought response protocols and agricultural innovation programmes, among others.