On the final scheduled day of COP30 (November 21), the Presidency released a strengthened draft of the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) under the Paris Agreement, proposing a new Just Transition Mechanism that could become a major institutional anchor for global climate transitions. The mechanism is intended to boost international cooperation, technical assistance and capacity-building for countries navigating the social and economic transformations required by climate action.
Yet even as the draft advances the architecture of just transition, it stops short of meeting the central demand of developing nations: predictable, additional finance. Despite noting the widening adaptation finance gap and mounting debt burdens across vulnerable economies, the text does not secure any new or guaranteed financial commitments from developed countries. Instead, it leans on broad encouragement for support and avoids explicit obligations — a clear dilution of earlier “means of implementation” language requested by developing-country blocs.
The November 21 draft also reflects significant political trade-offs. References to climate-related, trade-restrictive unilateral measures — language championed by the G77 plus China, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), and the African and Arab Groups — have been removed. At the same time, the phrase “transition away from fossil fuels,” strongly supported by developed countries, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), has also disappeared.
The proposed Just Transition Mechanism is the most consequential element of the revised text. It would be further developed through 2026 and put forward for adoption at CMA8, with Parties invited to submit their views by March. The Presidency frames it as a platform to “enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing,” effectively anchoring just transition more firmly within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) system.
Still, the draft avoids confronting long-standing divides. While it reaffirms equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), finance-related language remains deliberately soft — a compromise likely to frustrate developing nations seeking clearer commitments.
Several earlier points of contention have been ironed out. Paraguay and Argentina’s objections to the use of the term “gender” — part of a broader pushback against rights-based language — are no longer reflected. All references to critical minerals, which China opposed due to strategic and geopolitical concerns, have also been removed. With these disputes settled, negotiators are now better positioned to focus on the broader architecture of the JTWP, though the deepest disagreements — particularly those related to finance and obligations — remain unresolved.
The draft frames just transition as “multisectoral, multidimensional and cross-cutting,” moving well beyond energy systems. It embeds human rights, labour rights, Indigenous Peoples’ rights and social protection, while stressing that transitions must be “people-centric, bottom-up and whole-of-society.” It calls for decent work, skills development, social dialogue, and recognition of the informal economy, while elevating universal energy access — especially clean cooking — as foundational to equitable climate pathways. Adaptation and climate resilience feature prominently, reflecting consistent messaging from developing countries that just transition cannot be treated solely as an energy transition agenda.
For India and other developing nations, the outcomes are mixed. The strong reaffirmation of equity and CBDR-RC aligns with India’s position that just transitions must reflect historical responsibility and national development priorities. The expanded framing — encompassing adaptation, resilience, livelihoods, social protection and informal workers — matches the realities of developing economies. India’s emphasis on poverty eradication, energy access and country-specific pathways is clearly embedded.
However, the absence of additional, predictable finance from developed countries remains a major concern. India, which has repeatedly highlighted the need for scaled-up concessional support across mitigation, adaptation and clean energy access, will likely view the softened financial language as a missed opportunity, particularly given the draft’s own admission that finance gaps and debt distress “may hinder” just transition outcomes. For the wider Global South, the lack of financial and trade-related protections risks limiting the real-world impact of the proposed mechanism.
Even so, the mechanism’s creation offers India strategic space to influence its design and ensure it advances domestic priorities — from coal-region transitions and MSME resilience to green jobs, skills, clean cooking and energy security.
In week one, the G77 and China — representing 134 developing countries — had proposed establishing a mechanism to coordinate JTWP implementation and mobilise additional finance. Developed countries, led by the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), remained unconvinced, questioning the need for another UNFCCC mechanism. Nigeria argued that a dedicated body was necessary to provide a coherent institutional home capable of mobilising predictable finance for the Global South.
Simultaneously, developing countries led by the LMDCs, Arab Group and African Group pushed for explicit recognition of the cross-border impacts of unilateral trade measures on their transitions. Saudi Arabia, speaking for the LMDCs, cited the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), arguing it reflects protectionism rather than climate ambition. India and China added that such measures could reverse climate finance flows — effectively moving money from the Global South to the Global North — violating CBDR-RC. Developed countries rejected this framing, noting that the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement are not designed to validate or regulate domestic policies. The EU instead proposed a Just Transition Action Plan for voluntary exchange of experiences, avoiding new obligations.
Negotiations in the second half of the week centred on the November 14 draft text issued by the Presidency. Among the many points of divergence, one of the most politically charged was the reference to “transitioning away from fossil fuels,” a red line for Russia and the Arab Group.
Speaking in its national capacity, Oman emphasised that fossil fuels remain critical to its economic stability and social development, and warned that language calling for a transition away from them would, paradoxically, hinder its own decarbonisation efforts.
At the third annual high-level ministerial roundtable on November 21, the Global South reiterated its call for a UNFCCC-anchored mechanism and finance-centred equity, while the EU and UK argued for structured social-transition models tied to 1.5°C and economic reform.
The final November 21 draft reflects this tug-of-war: structurally aligned with the Global South, but substantively softened in ways that favour developed country positions.
“The proposal for a just transition mechanism was championed by civil society, and then supported by G77 and China. It is great to see it included in the text. As we advance, it must become a constructive space of international cooperation on just transition efforts,” says Avantika Goswami, Programme Manager–Climate Change at the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE).
Negotiators now face the task of refining the contours of the Just Transition Mechanism while grappling with unresolved tensions over finance, rights-based language and national sovereignty. For now, the Presidency has delivered a text that advances the institutional framework for just transition — while carefully sidestepping the political and financial sensitivities that continue to define this debate.