Over 300,000 people have been displaced from Singrauli over the past 65 years due to mining and power projects.
Shashi Singh, who has advised the government on resettlement law, says earlier policies ignored the trauma of repeated displacement.
Coal India’s land-for-job policy created new social and economic inequalities within families.
Private firms’ introduction of a “subsistence allowance” in 2008 marked a rare improvement in compensation.
Singh warns that the shift to renewable energy offers fewer jobs and calls for structural economic reform in the region.
Part two of a Down to Earth (DTE) series exploring the scars of displacement in Singrauli. Read part one here.
People have been displaced in Singrauli for the past 65 years, with more than 300,000 people uprooted so far. Many have been forced to move not just once but repeatedly. Despite losing their homes again and again in the name of development, they continue to face long struggles for fair compensation after each displacement.
Anil Ashwini Sharma spoke in detail with Shashi Singh, a Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge, who has been working on compensation and resettlement policy for repeatedly displaced people for the past four decades.
AAS: In an area like Singrauli, which has become a benchmark in the energy sector, people have faced multiple displacements. Our policies usually address only the initial phase of displacement. Singrauli shows a trend of repeated displacement. Is this multiple displacement a result of government policy failure?
SS: In the context of your question, the answer would be yes. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 did not include the concept of multiple displacement. It was not considered then that a person could be displaced more than once.
In July 2011, I was part of the expert group of the DN Yugandhar Committee. While drafting the new law, I highlighted that the displaced people of Singrauli were not being considered from the perspective of multiple displacement. If you look at Section 40 of the new Land Acquisition Act, it directly addresses this problem in Singrauli.
At that meeting, I stated that we should make efforts to prevent multiple displacement. Multiple displacement was clearly evident in Singrauli. This happened because the previous law did not grasp the sensitivity of displacement and how difficult and painful it can be. The problem of repeated displacement was beyond imagination at that time. The earlier law simply lacked understanding of it.
The new law recognised this issue and introduced policy mechanisms to address it. The most important point is that if multiple displacement cannot be prevented, the compensation amount must be doubled.
AAS: There is uncertainty about the number of displaced people in Singrauli. Data is essential for shaping any policy. What does your experience tell you about this?
SS: Singrauli has a population of roughly 1.1 million, including 900,000 urban residents and 200,000 rural residents. Within this population, around 200,000-300,000 people have been displaced. This number of displacements caused by multiple projects since 1962 is alarming.
However, it is difficult to provide exact figures. Before this, no official records were kept of those displaced by the Rihand project. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Northern Coalfields Ltd’s (NCL) Northern Coalfields mining project and the NTPC project began, some official records started being maintained. Considering the entire Singrauli region, there is no doubt that at least 200,000-300,000 people have been displaced.
AAS: Has NCL’s rehabilitation policy corrected the mistakes of the past? Have its policies proven more sensitive towards the displaced? How do you view this in the context of Morba?
SS: For this, we must examine legal commitments. The Central Acquisition Policy contains binding legal obligations. Anyone formulating their own policy must remain within the framework of the current Central Rehabilitation Policy.
NTPC (formerly National Thermal Power Corporation) or NCL’s provisions or rehabilitation benefits cannot fall below the standards set by the Central Rehabilitation Committee. However, if they wish to develop a specific rehabilitation policy for a particular case, they can exceed the Central policy, but they cannot reduce it. Therefore, the standards of the Central Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Policy are binding.
AAS: Did Coal India formulate its own rehabilitation policy? What was its impact?
SS: Coal India’s policy provided one job for every two acres of land acquired. The policy was based on the ratio of land acquisition. If four acres of land were taken from a family, Coal India offered permanent employment to two members of that family.
Land-based employment has been Coal India’s approach. However, this “two acres, one job” formula was not part of the central policy framework. The central law mandates providing livelihoods for displaced people, not necessarily jobs. Companies are directed to prioritise employment, but they are not legally bound to provide jobs.
Coal India’s own policy ensured one job per two acres of land, but it left out the landless, sharecroppers, and others dependent on agricultural produce. Moreover, this policy led to family divisions. Often, one child in a family received a job while the other did not. Because jobs were allocated based on land ownership, it created new economic inequalities within families.
From a sociological perspective, this is significant—it changed the economic structures of many families. A child who secured a job through the land-for-employment policy saw their lifestyle transform completely, while another remained dependent on agriculture and economically weaker. Coal India’s policy can thus be viewed through the lens of employment versus family economic structure.
AAS: Madhya Pradesh’s rehabilitation policy was considered more equitable. Why was it not implemented?
SS: Madhya Pradesh’s rehabilitation policy must adhere to the central government’s framework. It can exceed the centrally established scale but cannot fall below it.
I analysed Madhya Pradesh’s policy when it was released in 2002. A key element of the new land acquisition framework is the determination of land compensation rates. Under this policy, the market value can be multiplied by a factor based on potential development in rural areas.
For administrative feasibility, this multiplication factor was kept between 1 and 2. This approach was scientifically logical. Each geographical location has its own characteristics—a village near Indore or Bhopal is not the same as one in Sidhi or Singrauli. These are all rural, yet their circle rates vary significantly. Therefore, land values cannot be determined solely on rural rates.
In July 2011, the BN Yugandhar Committee recommended a scaling system, and for administrative convenience, the factor was limited to a single digit. I cannot say much more about Madhya Pradesh’s policy, as I do not have detailed information about it.
AAS: Coal India formulated a new rehabilitation policy. Did the private sector’s policies offer better compensation for the displaced?
SS: This is an interesting aspect because the private sector has been involved in land acquisition in Singrauli since 2008. NTPC and NCL have participated, but the private sector has played a larger role.
I was involved in policy formulation in 2008, so I can speak in detail. At that time, a policy was created at the district level under the name “Subsistence Allowance” (or Jeevan Nivah Bhatta in Hindi). The key provision stated that if a project failed to provide employment to a displaced family, a subsistence allowance would be paid instead.
This was a milestone in land acquisition and rehabilitation. In 2008, Vivek Porwal, now Chief Revenue Secretary, was the Collector. As a friend, I discussed this policy with him extensively. It began with Reliance and later extended to Hindalco. Some people misunderstood it as an unemployment allowance, but that was never its intent.
This entire policy was my concept. If a project failed to provide employment to one person per family, it had to pay a subsistence allowance. This was a positive initiative by the private sector — something not seen in public sector undertakings (PSU), where people were either given jobs or nothing at all.
In PSUs, contracts typically last five to seven years, after which only operational maintenance remains, requiring limited regular staff. Given this reality, the private sector has indeed taken a better initiative than the public sector.
AAS: NTPC’s rehabilitation policy was shaped by World Bank loans. Currently, the displaced residents of Morba are protesting for their rights. Given that Morba is an urban area, can these protests ensure fair rehabilitation packages for residents?
SS: If you look at Singrauli, protests are not new—they have become part of the system. World Bank loans have had a positive influence on these projects, leading to improved policies within public sector undertakings.
The World Bank’s insistence on social safeguards was not part of the original framework of these projects, which were rooted in colonial-era thinking aimed at resource extraction. Transparency and social responsibility were absent.
When the World Bank began investing in public sector undertakings, its pressure led to the inclusion of social security elements. Previous NTPC projects, like those in Vindhyachal, have improved significantly as a result.
As for Morba, protests are ongoing. Unfortunately, compensation is now determined by the presence of active civil society organisations. Singrauli lacks a credible and capable civil society group that can engage professionally with the government or PSUs to shape public-interest policy.
Public participation and representation are essential in shaping policies that reflect people’s needs. Morba’s future is uncertain. It faces challenges due to ongoing coal mining. The current phase could last another 10 to 15 years, after which I doubt there will be much diversity in the energy sector.
Therefore, it is crucial that people clearly articulate their needs to NCL or the government. A legally binding memorandum of understanding could pave the way for fair compensation.
AAS: Recently, the central government opened renewable energy investments in public utilities like NTPC to the private sector. Will this have any impact?
SS: It is important to understand the limitations of renewable energy and the kinds of jobs it generates. Consider, for instance, the Madhya Pradesh government’s solar power plant in Rewa — a 750-megawatt project. How many people does it employ?
If you investigate this, you will find no more than 600 jobs within a 150-kilometre radius. Workers are deployed in three shifts of about 200 each, including security staff and engineers.
Now compare this to mining or thermal power. NTPC’s Vindhyachal thermal power project, India’s largest at 4,950 MW, employs around 7,200 people, including direct, indirect, contractual, and operational staff. A single NCL coal block employs over 10,000 people.
This discrepancy is stark. Renewable energy is vital for the country and the environment, but where are the jobs? There is an urgent need to make comprehensive structural changes to district economies so that displaced people can be meaningfully relocated and employed.