The government of Gujarat implemented the Samras model in 2001-02 “to encourage amity and harmony in the village and to encourage dispute-free villages”. In this context, it is important to examine whether these objectives have been achieved. If the preference of the people in the elections held since the scheme’s implementation is observed, it suggests that the percentage of village panchayats opting for Samras has never crossed 21.66 per cent. This indicates that the preference is declining.
The implementation of Samras in the state stirs a debate over its merits and demerits. Those in favour argue that the scheme not only helps in maintaining peace in villages but also in saving election-related expenses. Critics, however, emphasise that individual voting rights are fundamental in a democratic system, and no cost is too high to validate them. Political observers aware of Indian politics know that even for small units such as village panchayats, the actual cost of conducting elections to the government exchequer is far less than the huge amount spent by the candidates themselves. Interestingly, in some Samras village panchayats, candidates acknowledged having spent money similar to those candidates who contested elections in their neighbouring panchayats. Often, this money was spent to keep the village residents in good humour and to dissuade them from filing nominations.
As for harmony, in some Samras village panchayats, people have accused “influential individuals” of imposing the decision on them. In panchayats where normal elections were held, the social environment also became disturbed, because some people were treated as “traitors” for necessitat-ing an election and were blamed for the village being denied government grants. This underlined how government-sponsored financial incentives can override other factors. It suggests that in both the situations, whether panchayats opted for Samras or not, villages experienced “disharmony”. This trend appears to continue as long as the Samras option is available in the state and the debates surrounding the choices made by their panchayats remain.
In some panchayats, candidates proposed for the ward membership or for the post of sarpanch under Samras, but no consensus was reached. Yet, the same candidates later won through elections. This gives an illusion that the elections were unnecessary. However, a closer look at the election results revealed a narrow margin of votes separating the winner and losing candidates. This indicated that when people were given the opportunity to choose through secret ballot, they expressed their preference freely. As for efficiency between the Samras and non-Samras panchayats, there was no major difference.
However, most of the Samras panchayats appeared to have an edge as there was discipline prevailing in the villages. The elders and the influential individuals who were instrumental in deciding Samras for their panchayats ensured the works were done efficiently.
Village elders, most often from land-owning castes wielding significant control over the village economy, convene meetings to decide on consensus candidates for the posts of sarpanch, her/ his deputy, and the ward members. The Samras panchayats studied by the author stood out for their inherent social cohesion or dominance by a feudal structure usually led by a single family or a group of families. This set-up brings order and development in the village, but undermines democratic participation envisioned by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, which promotes competitive elections. The real tragedy is that the majority of people end up pretending to support the chosen candidates. This process ultimately results in depriving marginalised communities in unreserved constituencies from securing representation in the decision-making process despite their numerical strength.
The Bharatiya Janata Party, in power since the inception of Samras, and the Indian National Congress, which originally proposed the idea of consensus elections in the state, locally known as Binharif, in 1992, may have had the best of intentions to see villages free from conflicts that typically erupted after local body elections. However, both must recognise that compromising core democratic principles is not a viable solution.
(Madhusudan Bandi is faculty member at the Gujarat Institute of Development Research, Ahmedabad)
This column is part of the cover story Forged consensus originally published in the August 16-31, 2025 print edition of Down To Earth