In politics, change rarely occurs abruptly. It arrives via a series of seemingly unrelated decisions—an agreement struck overseas, a session halted at home, and a parade intended to reassure. Individually, they appear routine. When read together, they show something more significant: a republic trying how far it can go without strengthening the institutions designed to keep it together.
Recent developments in India point to precisely this moment. The state is growing rapidly—economically, diplomatically, and militarily—while its democratic machinery strains to keep up. The dilemma for India in the coming decade is not whether it can expand or project power, but whether it can do so without undermining the processes that give that power legitimacy.
The conclusion of the long-negotiated free trade deal with the European Union provided the clearest indication. After years of deliberation, New Delhi selected institutional commitment over tactical uncertainty. In a period of splintered supply chains and competitive protectionism, this decision is less important for tariff schedules than for what it tells about India’s strategic self-conception. India is no longer simply navigating the global order; it has chosen to integrate itself into it.
However, trade agreements do not operate in abstraction. Their success depends on the country’s ability to do things like enforce environmental laws, protect workers’ rights, and make it possible for smaller businesses to compete. Without these, being open on the outside could cause problems on the inside. Not by diplomatic applause, but by India’s governing institutions’ ability to handle complexity without adding new exclusions, will the agreement’s promise be judged.
At home, the tension between projection and being ready is much clearer. Instead of being a place for economic discussion, the Budget Session of Parliament has become more and more of a place for trouble. This isn’t just a matter of political etiquette. Legislators who do not deliberate do not turn progress into trust. Stress at work, gaps in social security, following environmental laws, and inequality between regions are no longer small problems; they affect how people see economic growth.
The difference is what stands out. India’s reputation around the world is one of trust and clear strategy. The culture of the legislature at home seems fragile. The executive moves quickly, but supervision doesn’t happen very often. This imbalance doesn’t hurt the state right away, but it does make it harder for feedback systems to work, which are what keep policies from failing in the long run. Democracies don’t fail because they make quick decisions; they fail when decisiveness takes over responsibility.
The symbols of Republic Day fit this conflict perfectly. Indigenous defence systems, technological prowess, and cultural diversity were all on display, which helped to build a story of national confidence. But symbols can’t take the place of government. Modernising the military without being careful with money, or recognising other cultures without including them in politics, creates distrust instead of unity. When institutions can’t support pride, it becomes weak.
These examples all point to a major problem that will define the next decade: alignment. India’s external posture is advancing more rapidly than its internal consolidation. This isn’t a problem with aiming; it’s a problem with sequencing. It is hard to handle power when it doesn’t come from strong institutions. Political instability happens when growth happens without thought. National assertion devoid of democratic reinforcement jeopardises the conversion of strength into strain.
The problem is not overreach but asymmetry. When international credibility improves but domestic procedures deteriorate, the state begins to rely on performance rather than consent. This may increase speed, but it reduces robustness. The long-term viability of India’s change will be determined less by headline growth or diplomatic prominence than by Parliament, regulatory organisations, and judges’ ability to serve as trusted intermediates between the state and society.
This difficulty is not specific to India. Executive supremacy, constricted discussion, and a shrinking tolerance for dissent are all issues confronting democracies around the world. However, given India’s size, the impacts are magnified. Institutional shortcuts adopted today will set precedents tomorrow. Over time, procedural deterioration proved more difficult to correct than economic miscalculation.
That is why the restoration of Parliament’s importance is more important than any individual policy outcome. Scrutiny is not an impediment to government; it is the condition that gives governance credibility. Budget debates, committee reviews, and legislative negotiations are not delays; rather, they serve as safeguards. Economic reform that avoids deliberation may succeed numerically, but it rarely lasts politically.
The same reasoning now governs foreign policy. Trade partners, investors, and strategic allies are increasingly weighing governance quality against market potential. Regulatory uniformity, judicial independence, and institutional transparency are now considered strategic assets. Democratic strength is no longer independent of national power; it is one of its origins.
India is at a familiar crossroads: it can either speed up or slow down. There is no choice between strength and democracy; there is only a choice between short-term momentum and long-term stability. If the next ten years are to be seen as a time of national growth instead of wild claims, agreement must come before disagreement. Institutions need to be able to do their simple, unglamorous work.
There is a lot of ambition. The question is whether India will slow down just enough to keep its ambition alive.
The next ten years in India will be shaped not only by its goals but also by how well the systems that make those goals happen work. It’s important to make trade deals, announce budgets, and act tough on the world stage, but these things aren’t enough on their own. There need to be organisations that can help, question, and fix them. Growth that isn’t challenged, controlled, or watched may look good on paper, but it may not feel real.
So, the issue going forward is more about finding a balance than going fast. India needs to work on the less exciting parts of government, like making sure the government is responsible, making laws that are clear, and having parliamentary oversight. This is especially important as India gets more involved in global markets and expands its strategic footprint. These aren’t just rules; they’re how people talk to the government.
If democratic processes are viewed as inconveniences rather than safeguards, policy outcomes may become weak and exclusionary. In contrast, when institutions are given time and space to function, they foster confidence that no symbolic display or economic statistic can replace.
India has previously experienced similar moments of recalibration. The coming years will put to the test whether it can solidify power without concentrating it, as well as flourish without limiting participation. The republic’s long-term viability will be determined not by how quickly it moves, but by how well its institutions stay together—especially when pressure, urgency, and uncertainty are high.
Anusreeta Dutta is a columnist and climate researcher with experience in political analysis, ESG research, and energy policy
Anugrah Tripathi is Senior Technical officer in Indian Council of Forest Research and Education
Views expressed are the authors’ own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth