Lucknow’s October 2026 flooding was driven not only by upstream rainfall, but by the constriction of the Gomti’s floodplain and obstruction of natural drainage channels.
On October 7, the Gomti’s discharge was about 25,000 cusecs and the water level at Hanuman Setu remained below the warning mark, yet several low-lying settlements were flooded.
The article argues that embankments, riverfront projects, roads and encroachment on ponds, wetlands and smaller streams have weakened the city’s natural flood-management system.
Lucknow needs legal protection for remaining wetlands, ponds and drainage channels, and floodplain planning based on hydrology and historical inundation rather than development convenience.
Every episode of urban flooding in Lucknow brings familiar explanations: unprecedented rainfall, climate change, overflowing drains and the inability of the Gomti to carry excess water. These factors matter, but they do not explain the entire crisis. The more uncomfortable question is: what have we done to the river, its floodplain and the city’s natural drainage system?
A river and its floodplain are not open spaces that can be forced to accommodate every development project. Together, they form a dynamic hydrological system. Floodwater needs space, and the natural landscape provides that space through floodplains, wetlands and interconnected drainage networks.
When these vital spaces are occupied or fragmented, flooding becomes more likely and its consequences more severe. We cannot destroy a city’s natural flood-management system and then blame the rain.
The Gomti has flowed through this landscape for centuries. Its river terraces, floodplains, ponds, wetlands and drainage networks evolved to carry, convey and store water. Yet newer settlements and township development projects have progressively occupied and fragmented these vital spaces.
The Gomti serves as the primary drainage channel for several upstream districts, including Lucknow, Pilibhit, Lakhimpur Kheri, Shahjahanpur, Sitapur and Hardoi. It is fed by 185 tributaries, 35 of which are major streams.
Earlier, the Lucknow Development Authority and the Irrigation Department jacketed the riverbanks and constructed embankments that blocked numerous natural drains. A river requires space to convey and discharge water. This is a natural process that also yields economic benefits worth billions of rupees through ecosystem services. The river’s entire valley profile has been drastically altered.
Flooding in upstream areas such as Faizullaganj, Manjhi and Bakshi Ka Talab is a direct consequence of development activities within the floodplain, especially embankments and riverfront projects that have constricted the width available for floodwater flow. This is not simply a natural flood event.
Yet, despite this man-made flooding situation, approval has been granted for the construction of more embankments. Subsequently, the reclaimed land is slated for use in real estate, parks or commercial zones.
The minimum distance between embankments should be determined by the river’s peak discharge and water-carrying capacity, not by how much land can be appropriated from the river for real estate and residential settlements.
In recent years, many smaller streams have also been encroached upon or fragmented, leading to flooding even during short spells of rain.
Our studies have shown that more than 70 per cent of Lucknow’s lakes and ponds have been encroached upon. Yet the land authority remains largely occupied with high-end commercial areas and apartment projects.
The Lucknow Development Authority has planned numerous housing colonies and major developments, while hundreds of unauthorised and unplanned settlements have continued to mushroom across the city. Ponds and wetlands have been encroached upon, and natural drainage channels have been obstructed or narrowed.
This is not merely a failure of urban design. It raises serious questions about land-use regulation, enforcement and institutional accountability.
Observations during the October 2026 flooding in Lucknow raise important questions. In several locations, areas beyond the natural river terrace remained dry, while water accumulated within or behind the constrained river corridor. Such patterns require scientific investigation into the effects of floodplain engineering, embankments, roads and obstructed drainage pathways.
Compared with earlier floods, the October 2026 flood in Lucknow was unique in many ways.
The flooding was not caused by rainfall in Lucknow, but by rain in the upstream districts of Pilibhit, Lakhimpur Kheri, Shahjahanpur and Sitapur. Gomti levels rose quietly but steadily in response to contributions from tributary streams.
The impact was seen almost a week after the rains, when the water level began to rise from October 2. The discharge was also much lower than during the 2008 flood, but more than 100,000 people were affected and 40,000 houses were partially submerged.
On October 7, 2026, the discharge was about 25,000 cusecs, with the water level at 107.30 metres at Hanuman Setu. This was almost one metre below the warning level of 108.50 metres. Yet it was enough to flood low-lying settlements such as Faizullaganj, Ghaila, Mama Colony, Daud Nagar, Millat Nagar, Jehta, Saitha, Hayat Nagar, Munna Lal Khera, Umrai Khera and Lohramau.
These settlements are located in the khadar area of the Gomti, where periodic flooding affects settlements during overbank flow events. The district administration deployed 52 boats in the flooded areas to transport people and deliver relief material.
The Lucknow Development Authority intensified drainage and relief work around Ekana Stadium, Phoenix Palassio Mall and Sector 7 of Gomti Nagar Extension, where Gomti water entered through the embankments. More than 30 pumps were deployed to drain out water.
The prolonged inundation was the result of several factors acting together, with encroachment on natural floodplains as the major factor. Numerous projects have come up on the Gomti’s active floodplain, obstructing the river’s natural ability to spread across its banks and forcing water levels to rise within the channel.
Apart from several existing pumping stations, the Lucknow Development Authority has proposed 12 additional pumping stations along the embanked river between IIM Road and Kisan Path.
Pumping stations can be essential in low-lying areas. But why must the city increasingly depend on power-guzzling pumps to remove rainwater that once moved through natural drainage pathways?
Roads, bunds and embankments built across drainage corridors create hydraulic barriers. During intense rainfall, water accumulates behind these bunds, gravity drainage becomes difficult and pumping becomes necessary.
First, we obstruct the natural movement of water. Then we spend large sums of money pumping away the consequences.
A pumping station can remove water and reduce waterlogging. A drain can convey water. An embankment can hold water. But none of them can replace a river, wetland or floodplain.
Every proposed pumping station should be assessed alongside the hydraulic effects of the roads, embankments and developments that make pumping necessary.
Let us visualise the historic floods Lucknow has witnessed in the past.
The city saw major floods in 1854, 1870, 1871 and 1891. In 1871, during the rains, the river at the Lucknow railway bridge was 180 metres wide and 12.5 metres deep. The water moved fast, with a velocity of 5.8 km per hour and an extreme discharge of 34,369 cubic feet per second, or cusecs.
Then came the record flood of 1894. On September 13 that year, the Gomti in Lucknow rose to 2.13 metres above the normal high flood level of 108.81 metres. The maximum discharge was 234,000 cusecs, almost 10 times the discharge recorded on October 7, 2026.
The roads by the river were totally submerged, and the water level was one foot above the ballroom floor of Chattar Manzil. No flood of such magnitude has occurred since 1894. The 1894 flood was the outcome of continuous rain on September 5, 6 and 7 in Lucknow and upstream districts.
In 1923, Lucknow experienced another record flood that inundated several low-lying settlements. The Gomti overflowed its banks, submerging many parts of the old city, Civil Lines and the cantonment. The peak discharge was about 75,000 cusecs.
The 1960 flood was one of the worst in Lucknow’s history. It was also caused by excessive rainfall in upstream districts. The river received additional water from several tributaries, including the Sarayan, Kathina, Kukrail and Sai rivers. The peak discharge was recorded at 125,000 cusecs, submerging almost half the city under several feet of water. Residents were confined to the first floors of buildings, and boats were deployed for rescue and transport. Army units patrolled the flooded areas in boats and distributed food and other relief materials.
The 1971 flood was the third highest on record in Lucknow, with a discharge of 107,000 cusecs. On September 8, 1971, low-lying settlements were underwater. The river rose about 1.8 metres above the danger mark. Floodwater submerged several parts of the city under three to four feet of water, affecting Hazratganj, Narhi, Daliganj and nearby residential areas.
The government deployed the army to repair embankment breaches and rescue stranded residents. More than 25,000 people were evacuated within 24 hours and sheltered in 18 relief camps. Elephants, boats and helicopters were used to support transport, evacuation and relief operations. The flood also threatened animals at the Lucknow Zoo, where some were moved to raised platforms and protected with sandbags and boulders.
The 1985 flood was also historic, when the river rose to 109.50 metres with a peak discharge of 74,000 cusecs.
The 2008 flood occurred in the last week of August after heavy rainfall in Lucknow and upstream areas pushed the Gomti above its danger mark of 108.5 metres. The water level at Gau Ghat was recorded at 109.97 metres, with a peak discharge of 42,019 cusecs.
On August 28, the level at Hanuman Setu was 108.99 metres, affecting more than 100,000 people and claiming at least 15 lives. The flooding was aggravated by Lucknow’s fragmented drainage system, which could not cope with stormwater runoff, particularly where natural drainage channels had been obstructed and wetlands encroached upon.
The problem extends beyond Lucknow.
On August 7, 2026, the Ministry of Jal Shakti issued the River Ganga (Rejuvenation, Protection and Management) Authorities (Second Amendment) Order, 2026, which was published in the Gazette on August 10.
The amendment introduced the category of an active floodplain, defined with reference to a one-in-five-year flood, and divided the broader floodplain into active, regulatory and warning zones extending through the 100-year flood extent.
It also removed the earlier reference to a ‘construction-free zone’ from the relevant provisions.
These changes raise serious concerns about the future protection of river space and the scope for development in flood-prone areas. Removing an explicit construction-free safeguard and relying on zonal regulation creates legitimate questions about how effectively vulnerable river spaces will be protected.
At a time when cities need to restore wetlands, protect drainage systems and give rivers adequate space, weakening clear safeguards against construction risks moving policy in the opposite direction.
For the Gomti, this concern is particularly significant. The river has already experienced substantial urban modification, including the restriction of parts of its floodplain through riverfront development. The priority should be to protect the remaining floodplain and restore hydrological connectivity, not create further pressure for construction.
The Lucknow Development Authority appears capable of planning high-end apartments, commercial areas, roads and major infrastructure. Yet unplanned settlements continue to expand, often in vulnerable locations. The consequences are borne disproportionately by people living in low-lying areas, including those with the fewest resources to recover from flooding.
This is not an argument for blaming vulnerable communities alone. Authorities must investigate who controls the land, who authorises or tolerates illegal construction, who changes land use, and who allows natural drainage systems to disappear.
Unauthorised occupation cannot be addressed fairly or effectively without examining the institutions responsible for preventing it.
Lucknow needs a comprehensive inventory and legal protection of its remaining ponds, wetlands and natural drainage channels. Floodplain delineation must be based on hydrology, geomorphology and historical inundation, rather than development convenience.
Major infrastructure projects must demonstrate their effects on flood conveyance, groundwater recharge and water storage before approval.
The city must also assess the cumulative impacts of the Gomti riverfront, the Green Corridor, embankments, roads and surrounding urban expansion. No single project should be examined in isolation from the river system it modifies.
The choice before Lucknow is clear: continue spending public money managing the consequences of ecologically unsound development, or restore the natural systems that have regulated water for centuries.
The Gomti is not flooding Lucknow. The land authority must accept how its own development decisions have increased flood risk.
The next flood should not be treated as an emergent natural disaster when the underlying causes are visible in our land-use planning and floodplain encroachment.
Views expressed are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth