Spain is set to host the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) from June 30 to July 3, 2025, in the southern city of Seville. Organised by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) once in a decade, FfD4 is poised to be historic. Outcomes from the conference are expected to shape how global financial frameworks support sustainable development for the decade ahead, including in securing the resources required to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A focus of this year’s conference is also reforming global finance to bring forth the money needed for climate action.
Negotiations among member states have taken place throughout the year, culminating in the adoption of the final draft outcome document, titled the Compromiso de Sevilla, on June 17 by consensus at the UN headquarters in New York. This outcome will be formally endorsed at the conference in Seville. Additionally, government representatives will make high level commitments, and thematic roundtables with various stakeholders will mark the way forward from the outcome document to operationalising the new development finance agenda.
The Financing for Development process was first launched in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, at a time when developing countries were grappling with rising debt burdens and limited access to concessional finance. The inaugural conference led to the Monterrey Consensus, a landmark agreement that called for urgent reforms in international taxation, aid commitments, and debt relief. Subsequent FfD conferences in Doha (2008) and Addis Ababa (2015) sought to build on this agenda. Yet today, the challenges persist and have in many ways intensified.
Over 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on servicing debt than on health or education. Many developing countries face fiscal constraints that limit public investment and social needs spending. Which is why throughout negotiations for the Compromiso, developing countries once again pushed for systemic reforms, including the establishment of a multilateral sovereign debt mechanism under the UN. Existing initiatives, like the G20 Common Framework and the earlier Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), have faced criticism for being slow, creditor-biased, and excluding key private lenders. Unfortunately, the language on debt architecture reform in the outcome document is weak, and diluted. Civil society observers have reported that due to resistance from Global North countries, the outcome document only proposes a voluntary intergovernmental process on sovereign debt, instead of endorsing a permanent UN-led multilateral mechanism, leaving developing countries without a clear path to debt relief.
One of the most pressing SDGs is SDG13, ‘Climate Action.’ The gap between available and required climate finance is wide, particularly for countries on the frontlines of climate change. However, the need to view the climate crisis and the debt crisis together — rather than in silos — has increasingly been established.
Take Ghana, for instance. The West African country is among the most climate-vulnerable, currently undergoing a drawn-out debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework. Ghana’s reliance on external borrowing, depreciating currency, and poor loan terms have resulted in burgeoning public debt, forcing the government to prioritise creditor payments over climate investments. Meanwhile, it is estimated that Ghana has received only five per cent of the financing it needs to implement its climate commitments.
This confluence of debt and climate vulnerability is creating a vicious cycle. Countries face mounting costs from extreme weather events, which drain limited fiscal space. At the same time, their debt levels and credit ratings restrict their access to affordable climate finance. Without systemic reform and meaningful relief, both debt sustainability and climate resilience remain out of reach.
As FfD4 convenes, the global development landscape remains fraught, and multilateralism is under strain in recent years. Foreign aid budgets in developed countries are shrinking, while climate finance needs continue to rise. Trust between the Global North and South is low, as was evidenced by last year’s COP29 climate finance outcome as well, and many developing countries are demanding that financial cooperation move from fragmented pledges to systemic fixes. Notably, the United States, having already withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, also withdrew from the FfD4 negotiations in the final stages. Jonathan Shrier, the US’ Deputy Representative to the ECOSOC stated that the US objected to multiple provisions of the text, including tripling the lending capacity of MDBs and the provisions on the sovereign debt workout process.
In parallel, the climate talks in Bonn that just completed this June, part of the lead-up to COP30 in Belem, also grappled with climate finance. The Baku to Belém Roadmap, which aims to mobilise $1.3 trillion annually for climate action by 2030, has seen contentious debate, with concerns about access, adequacy, and equity dominating discussions. Climate finance is no longer seen in isolation; it is embedded in a wider conversation about reforming global financial architecture.
The Seville conference is expected to generate not just a political declaration, but also a renewed commitment to addressing the structural barriers faced by developing countries—from debt distress to tax injustice, from climate vulnerability to unequal access to capital markets. While the Compromiso de Sevilla text has already been adopted, what it delivers in practice will depend on how it is interpreted and acted upon—by wealthy countries in their political and financial commitments, and by how strongly civil society and developing countries push for meaningful implementation and follow-through.