With the United States and Israel launching coordinated strikes on Iran under what they termed “Operation Roaring Lion” on the night of 28 February 2026, the conflict immediately crossed from a conventional military engagement into an environmental crisis of measurable scale. Within the first 10 days of the war, according to the Conflict and Environmental Observatory, satellite-based fire monitoring systems recorded over 300 incidents, 232 of which have been assessed for their environmental risk, with many clustered around hydrocarbon infrastructure.
By the third week of the war, these strikes had moved decisively beyond conventional strategic installations to directly target energy infrastructure. Notably, around 15–17 March 2026, Israel hit parts of the South Pars Gas Field. This is the world’s largest natural gas field that has triggered fires and raised alarms over massive methane leakage and regional supply disruption. In retaliation, Iran launched missile and drone strikes targeting energy-linked and logistical assets in and around Qatar, further escalating risks to one of the most sensitive hydrocarbon zones globally. These developments have effectively expanded the conflict’s environmental footprint, and it now affects more than a dozen countries. This is happening through air, sea, and energy systems. Amid this escalation, Donald Trump stated on Truth Social that “The United States knew nothing about this particular attack”.
With such facilities hit, the result is not only immediate explosions but prolonged oil fires, release of methane and volatile organic compounds, groundwater contamination, and trans-boundary air pollution. What is more troubling is that this destruction is not occurring in a legal vacuum, but instead it is happening in the presence of some of the most explicit international protections ever codified, now effectively pushed to the margins.
Under the Geneva Conventions, which were later strengthened by Additional Protocol I in 1977, environmental protection during armed conflict was not left ambiguous but addressed. Article 35(3) in the document categorically prohibits methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” This obligation is reinforced through Article 55, requiring parties to actively protect ecosystems and explicitly prohibiting reprisals against the environment. These obligations were drafted in response to the ecological devastation witnessed in wars like Vietnam, with the intent of setting a high legal threshold. However, that very threshold is now being tested.
The legal threshold here is widespread, long-term, and severe. The targeting of hydrocarbon infrastructure in the current war appears to meet each element of this legal standard with empirical clarity. For example, oil fires burn for weeks or even months once they start. They release amounts of bad stuff into the air, like tens of thousands of tonnes of CO2 and sulphur dioxide every day. This meets the long-term test. The pollution spreads far and wide. Models show that it can travel hundreds or over a thousand kilometers. It crosses country borders and affects whole areas. The damage is very bad. It fulfills the widespread criteria and at last what data we need to understand how severe burning gas fields can be.
Data from conflicts in the past can show how big the impact can be. During the 1991 Gulf War, 600 Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire, releasing an estimated 5 to 6 million barrels of oil every day. This generated over 500 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. Particulate matter spread across West Asia for months. Ecosystems can even collapse if they are exposed to toxins for a long time. Oil fires are really destructive. They cause a lot of pollution.
Another treaty known as ENMOD also known as The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques came into force in 1978, also prohibits the deliberate manipulation of natural processes, weather, climate, or geological systems, and when such actions produce “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.” It stops countries from changing natural things, like weather, climate, or geology. This includes actions that have long-lasting or severe effects. This is a rule to protect the environment and ecosystems. Yet, the ongoing strikes across West Asia and particularly on large-scale gas and oil infrastructure such as the South Pars complex is producing effects that closely mirror what ENMOD sought to avoid. Initial assessments indicate that damage to major gas facilities can release millions of cubic meters of methane per day, and with methane having a 28–34 times higher global warming potential than carbon dioxide, the climate impact is immediate.
Satellite observations in mid-March 2026 have already detected dense aerosol plumes stretching over 1,000 km, with localised sulphur dioxide concentrations rising several-fold above safe limits, pointing to a level of environmental disruption that is not accidental but structurally embedded like such targets.
Early modelling of the strikes suggests that if 10 to 15 major refineries or gas facilities are hit, they can release between 50,000 and 150,000 tonnes of CO2 per day per site. They can also release sulphur dioxide levels that are much higher than safe limits. For example, levels can exceed 1,000 µg/m³ locally, which is above the WHO safety limit of 40 µg/m³ for a 24-hour mean. The CO2 and sulphur dioxide released can have an impact on the environment.
Yet what’s most ironical is these emissions were not counted in the Paris Agreement, which does not require reporting of emissions during active conflict. There is a contradiction: countries keep submitting climate targets when there is peace, but their actions during war erase those gains in just a few days. The response has shown that there are weaknesses in the system. The UN Security Council has not been able to do much because of arguments between countries, which limits its ability to make sure people follow the rules or assess the impact in conflict zones. Similarly, while there is this concept of collective security in NATO, its legal framework does not impose binding environmental obligations during military operations. NATO’s strategic doctrines acknowledge environmental protection as a consideration, but not as a constraint. NATO’s plans do consider protection, but it is not a priority.
What is most striking is the gap between legal development and enforcement. Over the past five decades, international law has progressively recognised environmental protection during war from the 1977 Additional Protocols to ENMOD and UNCLOS, and yet the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrates how easily these norms can be sidelined. There is still no universally binding recognition of “ecocide” as an international crime, despite growing advocacy.
The Iran-Israel conflict thus represents a test of whether international environmental law in wartime has any real force. There are the existence of conventions and the clarity of articles, and the scientific consequences are also well understood. What is missing is not law, but compliance. And as long as environmental destruction remains legally secondary to military necessity, wars will continue to be fought not just against nations, but against the planet itself.
Abhay Tomar is Research Associate, Office of Member of Parliament; Director, PALIPRAYAS Foundation, and former LAMP fellow 2024-25
Views expressed are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth