Mismanagement of three major dams — Bhakra, Pong and Ranjit Sagar — worsened the 2025 Punjab Floods
Every dam can potentially help moderate floods to some extent in the downstream area. This is possible only when the dam is operated with that objective in mind. However, when the dam is NOT operated with that objective and is filled up as soon as there is water available, the same dam can in fact bring avoidable flood disaster in the downstream area.
This is exactly what has happened in Punjab ONCE AGAIN during the 2025 Southwest (SW) Monsoon. This has happened on numerous occasions in the past including in 1978, 1988 and 2023, for example.
During the SW Monsoon 2025, improper operations of the Bhakra dam on the Sutlej, Pong dam on the Beas and Ranjit Sagar dam on the Ravi river significantly contributed to worsening the Punjab flood disaster, based on available information.
Bhakra: A case for transparency
By August 1, the Bhakra dam was already 53 per cent full. Outflow from the dam was on an average of 22-23,000 cusecs during August 1-18 and increased significantly only on August 19-20 by opening the spillway gates for the first time in two years. By then, water level in the dam was already at 1,666 feet, just 14 feet from the Full Reservoir Level (FRL) and the dam was already 80 per cent full. The inflow during August 1-20 was 180 per cent more than the outflow, a major reason for having greater outflow in first 20 days of August as the dam was already going past the prudent water storage. The outflow till August 20 was essentially only for power generation, which too was not optimum on many days. As a consequence, when Punjab was facing heavy rainfall in the fourth week of August, the Bhakra dam had to increase rather than decrease the outflow, thus worsening the floods in Punjab.
By September 2 morning, water level reached 1,676.78 feet (dam 88 per cent full); by 6 am on September 3, 1,677.84 feet and further up to 1,678.45 feet (93 per cent full) by September 3 evening.
Was there actionable information available to increase the outflow from the Bhakra dam earlier than August 20? Indeed, going by the India Meteorological Department (IMD)’s daily district wise rainfall figures, rainfall was already very high in the Bhakra catchment in Himachal Pradesh districts like Shimla, Kullu, Mandi and Bilaspur, starting from the last week of July. The IMD’s regular forecasts about the impending high rainfall in Himachal Pradesh and Punjab was another separate reason for advance action in increasing releases from the Bhakra dam keeping in mind the downstream river carrying capacity. While the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB) claims that there have been several meetings of the Technical Committee to discuss flood preparedness and response, none of these discussions which have a direct bearing on public safety are available in the public domain. Agenda and minutes of all the meetings of the Technical Committee must be promptly available in public domain. Moreover, this also raises the question about the decision-making process of the Technical Committee.
Pong: A case when outflows went above inflows for five days
By August 1, the Pong dam was already over 60 per cent full and by August 18, 85 per cent full. Outflow from the dam increased significantly only on August 8 when the level was already 1,376.07 feet and the dam was already 83 per cent full, compared to the water storage capacity at full reservoir level (FRL). Inflow was significantly high on August 1-3 and August 5-6, but outflow had not increased, even though dam water level was already way higher than it should have been considering prudent management. Ultimately, the outflow had to cross 100,000 cusecs from August 29, bringing huge floods in the downstream areas of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab as by then, the water level had already crossed 1,393 feet on August 26, above the FRL of 1,390 ft. Thus, the Pong dam ended up bringing floods into Punjab when the state was receiving high rainfall.
Actionable information for advance water release from the Pong Dam: High Rainfall days in Beas catchment districts Kullu (August 26), Mandi (July 22, 29, August 6), Kangra (July 30, August 6, 12, 17, 25-26). These, the IMD rainfall forecasts for Himachal Pradesh and the water storage level in the dam should have required the Pong dam operators to increase water outflows in advance. They did not do that. As a result, they had to start releasing large quantity of water from August 26 while downstream Punjab was also facing floods due to local rainfall.
All the members of the technical committee, including those from the concerned states including Punjab, that were taking decisions about the water releases from Bhakra and Pong dams are clearly responsible for the operation of the Bhakra and Pong dams. It is claimed by BBMB officials in media reports that the rule curve of the two dams was reviewed and updated by the Central Water Commission (CWC) in 2024. This also raises questions about CWC as either the rule curve has been updated without taking into consideration the changing reality or the rule curves are not being followed. CWC, in any case, has a lot of explain in terms of failure of flood forecasting and no action for violations of the rule curve, among other aspects.
The total inflow into the Pong reservoir from July and August 2025 was an unprecedented 9.68 billion cubic metres (BCM). This is the highest ever inflow for this period since the commissioning of the dam. This is, in fact, another reason why outflows from the Pong dam should have been higher from July 2025 onwards.
The Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister has directed the HP Energy Department to file First Information Report (FIR) against BBMB and others for violating the dam safety norms and demanded that BBMB and others must compensate for the resultant losses. We hope this is taken to its logical conclusion and more such action is taken up in case of other such avoidable flood disasters, including by Punjab.
Speaking in the Himahal Pradesh assembly, Chief Minister Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu said continuous discharge of water from the Pong Dam on the Beas has created a flood-like situation in Fatehpur and Indora regions of Kangra district. He informed the House that an FIR was registered against the BBMB management at the Sansarpur Terrace police station in Kangra on July 26 for its alleged failure to ensure dam safety protocols. “Despite repeated devastation, including the 2023 floods, BBMB has neither compensated victims nor created safeguards. Our people are paying the price,” said the CM. The Punjab government also needs to take similar action against BBMB since the Punjab irrigation minister has also alleged that BBMB’s high water releases led to floods in Punjab.
Ranjit Sagar: A case where a minister admitted miscalculation
Outflow from the Ranjit Sagar dam on the Ravi river was 9,000 cusecs on August 24, jumped to 24,000 cusecs on August 25, 77,000 cusecs on August 26 and 173,000 cusecs on August 27 as the dam level by then had crossed FRL and reached 527.13 m. From August 27, for five days, outflow was greater than inflow, which by CWC definition means that the dam had generated floods. Clearly, the dam ended up contributing to floods in Punjab rather than helping moderate the floods in the downstream area.
Actionable information for advance water releases from Ranjit Sagar dam: High rainfall days in Ravi river basin districts like Chamba (July 30, August 2, 6, 25-26), Kathua (August 11, 12, 17, 26, 27) and Pathankot (August 2, 12, 15, 17, 24, 25, 26). But the dam authorities did not start releasing water after these high rainfall days or after the numerous IMD forecast of high rainfall in upstream areas, nor did they take into account the high water storage in the dam well before the dam filling season.
In an interview to The Indian Express, Punjab Irrigation Minister Barinder Kumar Goyal said about the operation of Ranjit Sagar Dam from August 24: “What happened was totally unexpected. No one had imagined it would be like this. All calculations were upended; flows came from the upper rivers in Himachal, as well as from the Pathankot side. So, when floodwaters from the upper reaches came down, even if less water was released from the dam, everything downstream would have been overwhelmed anyway. Moreover, if there’s any risk to the dam, then water has to be released. The dam cannot be endangered.”
This is clear admission on the part of the Punjab government that they had not taken into account the rainfall that was forecast and already happening in upstream Himachal areas and also Pathankot in Punjab and had to suddenly open the dam gates on Aug 27, leading to a major flood disaster in Punjab.
One of the direct consequences of the sudden release of over 1.7 lakh cusecs of water from the Ranjit Sagar Dam on August 27 was the damage to the Madhopur barrage on the Ravi and the death of at least one person involved in the repair of the dam. The mishap occurred reportedly due to non-opening of some of the gates of the barrage, which also raises question if the necessary dam safety protocols were being followed.
The record inflows into the three dams were driven by North India’s wettest monsoon since 2013 according to the IMD. Himachal Pradesh, where most of all the three dams’ catchment areas are, had 72 per cent above-normal rainfall in August. Kullu district had 152 per cent above normal and Mandi district had 76 per cent above normal rainfall in August 2025.
There were of course other anthropogenic contributors to the Punjab floods including the state’s far-from-adequate drainage system, breach of a number of embankments, encroachment on floodplains and water bodies and indiscriminate sand mining, among others.
Information required in public domain
There is an urgent need to ensure that information related to dam operations be promptly released in the public domain including the Rule curve (updated every 3-5 years), daily inflow, outflow, storage and names of those responsible for dam operations. Standard Operating Procedures for dam operations must include information about upstream river flows, upstream rainfall that has already happened, the forecast of rainfall in upstream and downstream catchment areas, vulnerable glacier lakes, streams, landslide prone areas and downstream carrying capacity balance of the flood flows from downstream area rainfall. This decision- supporting information should also be in the public domain on a daily basis and all this information must remain in archival form for at least five years.
It is also important to stress here, the need to maintain downstream river carrying capacity and also removal of those who are at risk in the downstream areas in a timely and humanely manner.
It is noteworthy here that what we see in floods in Northwest India this monsoon is not just water, but mostly heavily silt-laden water. This silt is making the floods more destructive and also filling up the reservoirs. The silt is coming from illegal dumping of muck created by dams and hydropower projects, roads, railways, bridges and indiscriminate sand mining. The silt generation is also increasing due to increasing landslides, high intensity rainfall, and catchment degradation including degradation of forests, water bodies, wetlands and streams. All these aspects too need urgent attention and action.
We urgently need to have an independent review of this disaster to understand what happened, what role was played by different dams and agencies to fix accountability, and learn lessons for the future. The consequences of failure to achieve this in the past including in the case of Punjab’s 2023 floods are apparent. If we do not change now, climate change is likely to make every new disaster worse than the previous one.
Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com) is with the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (https://sandrp.in/)
Views expressed are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth