What does Trump mean for international climate cooperation?

In his first few weeks as the 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump has signed several executive orders and made numerous announcements that spell disaster for global efforts on climate action. He has once again initiated the process of withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement and has cancelled international climate finance. 

He has also waged war on foreign aid — first enforcing a 90-day pause on all aid and then threatening to shut down USAID. This move could disrupt funding for crucial initiatives such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis treatment, refugee operations, and pandemic preparedness. And he has unleashed extensive tariffs against trade partners. But what does all of this mean for the world’s efforts to combat climate change?

The US quits the Paris Agreement — what now? 

The US has not yet formally exited the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. The last time the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement, the formal exit took place in 2019, triggering a one-year notice period. There was no COP summit in 2020 and 46th US President Joe Biden reinstated the country’s participation in 2021.

Despite the Trump administration’s previous withdrawal announcement (2017-2019), US negotiators continued attending COPs, advocating for agreements aligned with US economic and strategic interests. They also highlighted domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and transition energy systems.

This time, the US will remain a formal part of the COP process at COP30 in Brazil due to the mandatory one-year notice period. Beyond that, the path forward is unclear. Newly elected COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago has expressed concern over the US exit but also pointed out that the US remains a member of the UNFCCC, meaning alternative avenues for climate dialogue still exist.

It is likely that the US will not be pursuing its most recent Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), submitted by Biden officials late last year, which aimed to cut emissions by 61-66 per cent by 2035 (compared to 2005 levels). This comes at a time when the US has failed to make significant emission reductions — annual gross emissions (excluding land use, land-use change and forestry) declined at a median annual rate of just 0.77 per cent between 2010 and 2022. Achieving the NDC would require annual reductions of at least 6 per cent. 

Beyond its underwhelming climate performance and periodic withdrawals, the US’ engagement at the UNFCCC has been characterised by one more crucial aspect — acting as a blocker to the demands of developing nations. From objecting to the Kyoto Protocol’s higher emission targets for developed countries to ensuring that loss and damage funds are not linked to liability and compensation, the US has consistently resisted ambitious climate commitments. On climate finance, it has contributed far below its fair share to developing nations. Its role at the UNFCCC and affiliated spaces has not always been constructive.

Which is not to say that its exit from the COP will render it completely toothless. The US' hegemonic role in the global economy makes it a looming presence with influence that is difficult to dismiss, particularly on the issue of climate action — an issue which is intertwined with multiple real economy relationships such as trade, debt, and military partnerships.

Some of the key ways the US continues to exert its influence include:

• Control over the global financial system: The US dollar serves as the world’s reserve currency and is central to most international trade.

• Military strength: The US maintains the largest military in the world.

• Trade dominance: The US is the largest importer globally, with $3.37 trillion in imports (compared to China’s $2.71 trillion) and runs the biggest trade deficit. It has also hamstrung the World Trade Organization.      

• Influence over international financial institutions: The US is the largest shareholder in the World Bank and holds the largest Special Drawing Rights quota at the International Monetary Fund, with 82.9 billion SDRs.

• Sovereign debt dynamics: Of the $3.6 trillion in emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) debt, 47 per cent is held by private bondholders, many of which are US-based financial institutions and commercial banks.

• UN funding: The US provides 22 per cent of funding to the UNFCCC and is the largest overall funder of the UN.

• UN Security Council: The US holds veto power.

The US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement signals its backslide on domestic decarbonisation efforts and retreat from efforts to support the rest of the world with their transition. What does this mean for the global transition? Below, we outline three possible scenarios.

1. A regression in global climate action: In this scenario, the rest of the world (ROTW) either follows the US’ footsteps by resisting climate action, or resists it in retaliation to US' inaction. Countries may state that they do not want to sacrifice their growth and energy security — as the BRICS alluded to in their 2024 statement. For some countries, this may be more of a painful sacrifice than a deliberate choice — recent reports suggest that Colombia’s transition efforts may be cast in doubt owing to the US backing out at as a potential climate funder.

2. The ROTW leads the charge: Here, the ROTW advances climate action, perhaps with the European Union and China at the helm. Countries don’t focus on holding the US accountable but choose to leverage all possible ‘coalitions of the willing’ – sub-national actors, the private sector, new leadership from the Global South. This scenario is justified by the ‘pragmatic’ reality that the US contributes just 13 per cent of annual GHG emissions today, and that most of the emissions growth is in Asia — so efforts should focus there. Optimism around rising clean energy investment further boosts this sentiment, signaling that the economics of the transition may well be conducive already. US policies and investments continue to indirectly influence the global transition in this case, but it is not seen as a driver.

3. The ROTW holds the US accountable: In this scenario, the ROTW demands climate action, and also holds the US accountable for its inaction, not letting it off the hook. Building pressure, perhaps through sanctions or tariffs — maybe a historical polluter tax? —the world brings to the fore the fact that the US is responsible for a quarter of all historical GHG emissions, continues to emit even today, and funds polluting activities as well (64 per cent of fossil fuel investors are based in the US). This scenario will require strong coalitions to build pressure — both among South countries and between the climate-conscious North and South. Forums such as BRICS are able to turn their short-termism into a low-carbon, climate-resilient vision of growth that leapfrogs high-carbon development pathways and demands better from the world.

So where do we go from here? And which scenario is most likely to occur? Thie answer as always lies somewhere in the middle. Many countries have strong domestic drivers for climate action (e.g., air pollution, energy security, and economic opportunity) that do not entirely depend on international efforts and may continue investing in renewables for their long-term economic and strategic benefits. The assumption that energy security and climate action are at odds is outdated; renewables increasingly enhance rather than compromise energy independence. Solar power surpassed coal as a source in the EU for the first time in 2024. China achieved its renewable capacity target six years ahead of schedule.

Large emerging economies, on the other hand, are stuck in a more complex quagmire. Indonesia’s ambitions to phase out coal by 2040 look increasingly strained in a Trump 2.0 world. India, while ranking fourth in renewable capacity additions, remains a laggard and its latest Union Budget with underwhelming climate provisions, highlights more pressing priorities for the government than climate action, like unemployment, weak consumer demand and a vast micro, small and medium enterprises sector struggling to stay afloat. 

Developing countries are battling a polycrisis — unemployment, rising debt, inflation, geopolitical conflicts and escalating economic and trade war — which makes climate action an increasingly complex challenge.

The temptation to fall into despair about multilateral climate cooperation is high — particularly after the disappointment of Baku and this second Trump shock. Countries will be moved to look inward, or scramble to secure what they can from smaller bilateral or plurilateral groupings. Those dependent on the US for trade, aid, and investment will be hesitant to take on a confrontational tone with the US, particularly on the issue of decarbonisation, whose coalitions of support are still new, shaky, and unestablished. 

This is the moment to remember: A better world is possible. Strategising through strong coalitions for a low carbon future that leaves no one behind, minimises the extractivism of the past, and uses technology in the best possible way to transition away from fossil-dependent economies is not a pipe dream. It can and needs to be done, if we are to weather the storm of climate impacts that are already here. And it needs to be done cooperatively, keeping multilateral spaces alive — spaces that give equal voice to the smallest and the largest. In a climate-risked world, hopelessness is a luxury that we do not have.