Language calling out production of fossil fuels is now missing — a trade off for not making actions optional
Activists at COP28 venue, Expo City, in Dubai on December 12, 2023.Photo: COP28 / Neville Hopwood / flickr The fifth (and probably final) iteration of the Global Stocktake (GST) text was released early morning on December 13, 2023 and adopted with no objection at the closing plenary. GST is being termed the centre of the 28th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) and the text has, therefore, received much scrutiny.
After overrunning the timeline by a day already, country Parties convened during the day to discuss it further. The text has changes in language, accountability and the recognition of differentiated pathways.
COP28 President Sultan Al Jaber hailed countries and organisations for coming together on the revolutionary text.
Following concerns over the last draft which presented a list of actions on fossil fuels countries “could” take, the new iteration seems to have stronger language. It now calls on Parties to follow eight steps taking into account different pathways.
The phase down of coal no longer includes a stop to new coal generation. An earlier point on “reducing both consumption and production” of fossil fuels has been replaced with “transitioning away”.
It must not come as a surprise that the language calling out production of fossil fuels is now missing. That is the trade off for taking away the ability for country Parties to approach actions as an optional menu.
Right after the paragraph on fossil fuels, there is a mention of the role of transitional fuels to achieve the above. This references natural gas and was heavily stressed by Russia and Iran during the negotiations.
One highlight was the addition of recognising the role of carbon capture storage solutions “particularly in hard to abate sectors”. Emphasised by the European Union, this specification is expected to prevent abatement technology from being used as an excuse to expand fossil fuel production.
Elsewhere in mitigation, the text has removed the time period of 1850-2019 when talking about the depletion of the carbon budget by historical emissions. It does still, however, explicitly mention the pre-2020 gaps of developed countries in achieving the recommended emissions reduction. This was specifically pushed for by developing countries including India, African Group of Negotiators (AGN) and Group of 77 and China and actively opposed by the United States, EU, Australia and Canada.
There is a new mention recognising that emissions are projected to peak during 2020-2025 to limit warming to 1.5C. The paragraph also recognises that this peaking will take place in different timelines for countries depending on their national circumstances, thus accepting the different pathways language that many developing groups asked for.
The first line to notice is that the paragraph speaking to countries to come with their next Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) first reaffirms the nationally determined nature of them. The text also recalls the mandate of the Paris Agreement to provide new NDCs every five years informed by the GST outcomes.
Developing countries demanded that GST outcomes preserve the national sovereignty in enhancing NDCs. Whether a reaffirmation of the nationally determined nature of NDC will be enough remains to be seen.
There is acknowledgement that the successful achievement of NDCs in developing countries is subject to receiving adequate finance and other support. However, while earlier versions specifically highlighted that this must come from developed countries, there is no such accountability now.
The adaptation section acknowledges the efforts of countries in developing climate adaptation plans, communications and actions. This recognition was an ask of many countries, particularly the developing. The text also acknowledges the existing gaps in resources for adequate planning in adaptation.
A paragraph emphasises that adaptation action is critical in this decade and is subject to accelerated financial support.
However, a stark change shows up in other mentions of adaptation finance. They have all been moved to the means of implementation section from the earlier adaptation section. This ask was specifically from developed countries like the US and Australia. The developing countries had asked for adaptation finance to be part of the adaptation section.
The finance section of means of implementation has language specifically acknowledging the obligation of developed countries in leading climate finance. In this new version, there is also wording that climate finance must represent “a progression beyond previous efforts”, a point repeatedly emphasised by Global South groups like the AGN.
There is a paragraph detailing the role of the private sector in bridging finance gaps. Another one highlights the need to scale up additional, grant-based, highly concessional finance to support the just transition in developing countries. However, there is no specification on who must provide this grant-based finance.
There were requests by developed countries for the text to acknowledge their efforts in meeting the $100 billion a year goal and very likely having met it this year. The new text instead puts the figure at $89.6 billion in 2021 and a “likelihood” of meeting the goal in 2022.
Subsequently, it notes the failure in meeting the $100 billion a year goal and encourages developed countries to strive to meet it through 2025 and beyond.
On adaptation finance, the text calls for a report from developed countries on the doubling of adaptation finance from 2019-2025 next year, along with a call for a high-level ministerial dialogue to address the adaptation finance gap.
The loss and damage fund has been acknowledged along with a call for developed countries to continue taking the lead to fund it, although only in the finance section and not in the loss and damage section.
Article 2.1c has been recognised in its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The former speaks to aligning international finance flows with low carbon development, while the latter recognises that developed countries must provide finance to developing countries to assist both mitigation and adaptation. This complementarity was demanded by many developing countries who feared just a focus on Article 2.1c could be misinterpreted.
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